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Executive Overreaching in
Inmigration Adjudication
Fatna E. Marouf*
While P idents have bmadpowers over immigration, they have tradtionally shown
restraint when it comes to influencing the adjudication of individual cases. The Thanp
Administration, howeve, haspushedpast such conventional constraints. ThisArticle examines
executive overreaching in immigration adudication by analyzing three types of interference.
First the Article discusses political interfemnce with immigration adjudicators, including
politicized appointments ofjudges, politicized performance metrics, and politicized training
materials. Second the Article addmsses executive interference with the prcess ofadjudication,
examining how recent immigration decisions by former Attorney General Jeff Sessions curtail
noncitizens 'pracedural rights instead ofmaking policy choices and prmote pmsecution rather
thanfair adjudication. Third the Article examines executive policies that prevent aitudication
from takingplace, such as turning asylum seekers away atports ofentry, criminally prosecuting
them if they enter illegally, and separating them fimm their children. After discussing how these
forms ofexecutive interference threaten constitutional and statutory rights, the Article explores
how the judiciay, Congress, and agencies can help protect against presidential influence in
immigration adudication.
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INTRODUCTION

The scope of the President's power over immigration has been the
subject of much debate. Commentators dispute the division of
immigration powers between the executive and legislative branches, as
well as the scope of judicial review over immigration laws and
policies.! A key point of consensus, however, is that the President is
most constrained when it comes to executive adjudication.2 In the
1.
See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Centuy Origins of PlenaryPower over ForeignAffairs, 81

TEx. L. REv. 1, 160, 279 (2002) (examining the historical origins of the doctrine of inherent
powers); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Presidentand ImmigrationLaw, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 483-85, 546 (2009) (arguing that the President has exercised immigration
power through "inherent authority, formal delegation, and de facto delegation"); Catherine Y.

Kim, The President'sImmigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 9-15 (2018) (discussing the

expansion ofpresidential control over regulatory and prior executive restraint on administrative
adjudications); see also discussioninfra Part IIA (analyzing the sources and scope of executive
power over immigration, including the doctrine of inherent powers, enumerated and implied
constitutional powers, and powers delegated to the President by congressional action).
2.
See discussion infra Part IB.
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immigration context, executive adjudication involves hundreds of
thousands of decisions made by immigration judges (IJs) and asylum
officers each year to determine whether a noncitizen will be allowed to
remain in the United States. The Trump Administration, however, has
pushed past these traditional constraints, raising important questions
about how much interference in executive branch adjudication is
permissible.
Unlike federal judges who are part of the judicial branch, Us are
part of the executive branch.? Specifically, the immigration courts and
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or the Board), the appellate
body that reviews the decisions of immigration courts, are part of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within
the Department of Justice (DOJ).4 Us and Board members are career
attorneys in the DOJ appointed by the Attorney General.' The Attorney
General may only remove them for cause, but they can be reassigned
as a matter of discretion.' A direct chain-of-command exists between
the immigration courts and the nation's chief prosecutor, as the EOIR
Director reports directly to the Deputy Attorney General.' Thus,
although Us are not part of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), which is responsible for immigration enforcement, they have
long complained that their position under the Attorney General
undermines their independence.'
Because Us and Board members are not administrative law judges
(A]Ls), they do not enjoy the same protections for independence
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).9 Furthermore,
the APA's rules about ex parte communications regarding the merits of
a case, which are clearly prohibited with ALJs, do not apply as

8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2018).
3.
Id (discussing the organization of the EOIR within the DOJ); id § 1003.1
4.
(discussing the organization of the BIA); id § 1003.10 (discussing Us).
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(aXl).
5.
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
6.
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 373-74 (2006).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b).
7.
Strengthening and Reforming America's Immigration Court System: Hearing
8.
Before the Subcomm. on BorderSec. & Immigrationof the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. 3-5 (2018) (statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President, National Association of
Immigration Judges) [hereinafter Statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor].
See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643,
9.
1648 (2016); Judith Resnik, Whither and WhetherAdjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1145
(2006).
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forcefully to the EOIR.'o The President of the National Association of
Immigration Judges recently testified to Congress that "[i]t is no secret
that the DHS, whose attorneys appear before the Court, regularly
engages in ex-parte communication with the DOJ."" She further
testified that "these communications have directly led to the use of the
Immigration Court system as a political tool in furtherance of law
enforcement policies."l 2 There is also at least one documented case of
government attorneys under prior administrations contacting managers
at the EOIR to pressure Us to reach a certain outcome in a specific
case. 13

Civil service laws do provide some protection from political
discrimination against Us and Board members. Because these are
career positions, they "are not of a confidential or policy-determining
character." 4 Civil service laws prohibit discrimination in hiring for
career positions, including based on politics." Furthermore, Us and
Board members have a duty to "exercise their independent judgment
and discretion" in deciding the individual cases before them.'" This
responsibility, however, exists in tension with Board members' duty "to
act as the Attorney General's delegates in the cases that come before
them," which appears prominently in the first paragraph of the federal
regulations describing the Board."
The duty to exercise independent judgment and discretion is also
undercut by rules and policies that give special advantages to DHS
attorneys not enjoyed by immigrants or their representatives. For
example, DHS and the EOIR have shared access to certain databases

10. Exec. Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Ethics and
Professionalism Guide for Immigration Judges 15 (2011), https*//www.justice.gov/sites/
default/filesteoir/legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessionalismGuideforlus.pdf
(enumerating
limited circumstances in which ex parte communication between an IJ and a party should be
permitted).
11.
Statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Id In fact, "individual judges have been tasked with responding to complaints
voiced by DHS to [EOIR] management about how a particular pending case or cases are being
handled, in disciplinary proceedings without the knowledge of the opposing party." Id at-4.
13. See Legomsky, supra note 6, at 373.
14.
5 C.F.R. § 213.3101 (2018).
15.
5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(b)(2), 2302(bXl) (2012).
16.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1Xii) (2018) (board members); id § 1003.10(b) (IJs).
17. Id § 1003.1(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of
Quasi-JudicialIndependence in Immigration Appellate Adi&cations, 9 BENDER'S IMMICR.
BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004) (explaining the issuance ofa new rule in 2002 that placed the Board's
duty to act as delegates of the Attorney General above the duty to exercise independent
judgment in ordering the sections of the regulation).
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that immigrants and their representatives cannot access." DHS also
has ready access to the noncitizen's complete alien file, which the
noncitizen's attorney can only procure through a time-consuming
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. 9 These things create a
level of symbiosis between DHS and the EOIR that immigrants and
their attorneys do not enjoy.
Additionally, certain regulations explicitly favor DHS. For
example, a regulation specifies that DHS may refer cases to the
Attorney General for review but does not give immigrants the same
power.20 Another regulation gives DHS a one-sided veto of an U's
bond decision by allowing DHS to effectively override the judge's
decision through automatic stay powers. 2' DHS attorneys have also
benefited from the DOJ's refusal to pass a regulation implementing the
contempt authority that Congress provided Us in 1996, which is a way
for the DOJ to protect fellow government attorneys." Thus, no matter
how many times a DHS attorney is unprepared for a hearing, does not
have the file, misses a filing deadline, or fails to submit a court-ordered
brief, an U cannot hold the DHS attorney in contempt. 23 An attorney
representing the immigrant, on the other hand, is subject to discipline
and risks the client being ordered deported for the same actions.
These built-in forms of favoritism for DHS, however, pale in
comparison to the bias that results when the Attorney General and
President explicitly push for more deportations. Both President Trump
and former Attorney General Jeff Sessions have equated the rule of law
with deportation, not fair adjudication. On August 8, 2017, the DOJ
issued a press release titled "Return to Rule of Law in Trump
Administration Marked by Increase in Key Immigration Statistics,"
which boasted about a 27.8% increase in the total number of removal
orders compared to the same period in 2016, stressing that "[o]ver 90
See LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND
TIMuLNESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJDICATION 53 (2012), https-//www.acus.gov/
18.

sites/defawt/fles/documents/Enhancing-Quality-ad-Timeliness-in-mmigration-RemovalAdjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf.
19. Privacy Act; Alien File (A-File) and Central Index System (CIS) Systems of
Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 1755 (Jan. 16, 2007) (describing the alien file); How to Filea FOIA/PA
Reque4, U.S. CrrZENSHP & IMMIGR. SERVICEs, https-//www.uscis.gov/about-us/freedominformation-and-privacy-a-foia/how-file-foia-privacy-iac-request/how-file-a-foiapa-request
(last updated Nov. 30, 2018) (discussing the process of requesting immigration records).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(hXlXiii).
21. Id § 1003.19(iX2).
22. Statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supranote 8, at 4.
23. See id
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percent of these cases have resulted in orders requiring aliens to depart
or be removed from the United States."2 4 This press release was also
posted on the EOIR's website, undermining any appearance of
impartiality.25
In September 2017, the White House issued a Fact Sheet titled
"President Donald J. Trump Restores Responsibility and the Rule of
Law to Immigration," which announced Trump's decision to rescind
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and confirmed that
"President Trump supports the swift removal of those who illegally
enter the United States or violate the conditions of their visas."26 A
month later, on October 8, 2017, President Trump released a list of his
"Immigration Principles & Policies." His top priorities included
"tighten[ing] standards . . . in our asylum system" and "[closing]
[1]oopholes in current law [that] prevent 'Unaccompanied Alien
Children'. . . that arrive in the country illegally from being removed." 8
He also listed hiring more judges and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) attorneys in order to "ensure swift return of illegal
border crossers."2 This list makes it clear that what Trump expects
from Us and asylum officers is the rapid denial of asylum applications.
Then-Attorney General Sessions implemented Trump's
immigration policy preferences, which closely aligned with his own,
confirming the goal of rapid deportations. In a speech delivered on
October 12, 2017, Sessions endorsed Trump's call for "significant
asylum reform, swift border returns, and enhanced interior

24. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Return to Rule of Law
in Trump Administration Marked by Increase in Key Immigration Statistics (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/retum-rule-law-trump-administration-marked-increase-keyimmigration-statistics.
25. See Jeffrey S. Chase, The Need for an Independent Immigration Court,
OPINIONS/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/
2017/8/17/the-need-for-an-independent-immigration-court.
26. Press Release, The White House, President Donald J. Trump Restores
Responsibility and the Rule of Law to Immigration (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.white
house.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-restores-responsibility-rule-lawimmigration/ (emphasis added).
27. Letter from Donald J. Trump, President, to House and Senate Leaders (Oct. 8,
2017), https/www.whitehousegovibriefings-statements/resident-donald-j-trumps-letter-housesenate-leaders-immigration-principles-policies
(addressing immigration principles and
policies).
28. Id
29. Id
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enforcement."' He advocated for enforcing penalties for fraudulent
asylum applications, elevating the standard of proof in credible fear
interviews, expanding the ability to return asylum seekers to safe third
countries, and closing "loopholes" in asylum laws. In his speech,
Sessions stated that the "system is being gamed" by immigrants who
are just claiming a fear of persecution because "it has become an easy
ticket to illegal entry into the United States." 32 He also claimed "dirty
immigration lawyers" provide clients with "the magic words needed to
trigger the credible fear process."
How are Us and Board members, who are delegates of the
Attorney General, supposed to exercise independent judgment in light
of these clear marching orders to issue deportation orders and tighten
asylum standards? The relationship between immigration adjudicators,
the Attorney General, and the President becomes even more
complicated when one considers how brazenly Trump has denigrated
immigration laws and the immigration court system. Trimp has called
U.S. immigration laws "weak [and] ineffective," 34 "the worst
immigration laws in the history of the world,"s and "so bad that I don't
even call them laws." He has described the U.S. immigration system
as a "mockery" and a "joke."
Trump has specifically complained about the right to apply for
asylum under our law, saying, "You walk across the border, you put
30.
Att'y Gen. Jeff Sessions, Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(Oct 12, 2017), https*//www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-deliversremarks-executive-office-immigration-review.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id; see also Nicole Lewis, Sessions's Claim That 'Dirty Immigration Lawyers'
Encourage Clients to Cite 'Credible Fear,' WAsa PosT (Oct 26, 2017), https://www.
p comiews/fact-checker/wp/2017/10/26/sessionss-claim-that-dity-immigrationwashin
lawyrs-encourage-cients-to-cite-credible-fear/ (claiming that there is little evidence
supporting Sessions's remarks on the coaching done by immigration lawyers).
34. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwrrTER (Apr. 30,2018,5:38 PM EST),
https/twitter.com/realdonaldtirmpstatus/991084424992296962?ang=en.
35.
Miriam Valverde, As Donald hump Seeks Changes to Immigration Courts, What
Rights Do Immigrants Here Illegally Have?, POLrTIFAcr (June 28, 2018), https://www.
poltifact.cotruth-o-meter/article/2018/jun/28/donald-trump-calls-changes-immigrationsystem-what/ (quoting Trump at an immigration meeting with lawmakers in June 2018).
36.
Stephen Collinson, Trump: Immigration Is 'Changing the Culture' of Europe,
CNN (July 13, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/13/politics/trump-europe-immigration/
(quoting Trump at a joint news conference with British Prime Minster Theresa May in July
2018).
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrnmp), TwTER (June 24, 2018, 10:02 AM
37.
EST), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329.
38. Valverde, supra note 35.
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one foot on the land, and now you're tied up in a lawsuit for five years.
It's the craziest thing anyone's ever seen."' Time and again, he has
questioned why immigrants get to go to court at all, saying, "Whoever
heard of a system where you put people through trials? Where do these
judges come from?"" Trump has made it clear that he thinks "going
through a long and complicated legal process, is not the way to go" and
"will always be disfunctional [sic]." 41 His express preference is to
deport people immediately, "with no Judges or Court Cases."4 2 I
addition to these comments denigrating and dismissing immigration
courts, Trump has suggested that Us are vulnerable to corruption and
"graft"4 3 Trump's comment, "We don't want judges; we want security
on the border,"" summarizes his desire for rapid deportation and
suggests contempt for adjudication.
Given Trump's explicit statements about immigration courts and
the asylum process, his Administration's efforts to influence
immigration adjudication are not surprising. Yet they are highly
unconventional and show a lack of restraint in an area where Presidents
have traditionally been hands-off. This Article explores the question of
executive overreach into immigration adjudication by examining three
types of actions: (1) political interference with immigration
adjudicators themselves, (2) abuse of the Attorney General's authority
to review immigration decisions, and (3) the adoption of policies that
prevent adjudication from taking place.
These actions have had an enormous impact on immigration cases
under the Trump Administration, especially asylum cases, which raise
unique concerns because they involve life-or-death decisions and
39.
John Wagner, Trmp: Immigration Is 'Changing the Culture' of Europe and Its
Leaders 'Better Watch Themselves,' WASH. POST (July 13, 2018), https://www.washington
f-europe-and-its-leaders-betterpostcom/politicstrump-nigation-is-changing-the-cutur
watch-themselves/2018/07/13/afb5d9a6-868b-11e8-8ffc-46cb43e3f306_story.html? (quoting
Trump at a joint news conference with British Prime Minster Theresa May in 2018).
Allie Malloy & Tal Kopmn, Thonp Callsfor Sweeping Changes to USImmigration
40.
Legal Process, CNN (May 24, 2018), httpsi//www.cnn.com/2018/05/24/politics/donaldtrump-immigration-courts/index.html (quoting Trump's interview with "Fox & Friends" cohost Brian Kilmeade).
41. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwrrlER (June 25,2018,8:43 AM EST),
https*//twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/11 1228265003077632.
42. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwrrrER (June 24, 2018, 10:02 AM
EST), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329.
43. President Trump, Remarks at the National Federation of Independent Businesses
75th Anniversary Celebration (June 19,2018), httpsl//www.whitehouse.gov/briefmgs-atment
remarks-president-trump-national-federation-independent-businesses-75th-anniversarycelebration/.
44. Id
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implicate international obligations. The Refugee Act of 1980, codified
in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), implemented the United
States' obligations under the 1967 U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees and the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.4 5 These treaties establish the norm of non-refoulement, the
prohibition against returning refugees to countries where their life or
freedom is threatened.' Thus, it is critical to ensure that the executive's
influence on asylum cases does not violate the rights of asylum seekers.
This Article explores that border between permissible and
impermissible presidential influence on immigration adjudication,
which has received little attention from scholars thus far.47 Part H
discusses the sources of presidential power over immigration,
including inherent, constitutional, and delegated powers, as well as
This Part specifically examines
constraints on those powers.
constraints on presidential power in matters of adjudication.
Additionally, Part II examines the immigration powers of executive
leadership below the President, including powers delegated
specifically to the Attorney General, who is authorized to review
decisions of the Board.
Parts [i through V explore the three categories of executive
overreaching that are the focus of this Article. Part III discusses.
political interference with immigration adjudicators themselves,
including asylum officers, Us, and Board members. This Part discusses
45. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33,
July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; see also
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987) (explaining that Congress enacted the
Refugee Act in order "to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees"); Matter of S-P-, 211. & N. Dec.
486,492 (B.I.A. 1996) (acknowledging that Congress's intent in passing the Refugee Act was
to give effect to the United States' international obligations under the Protocol).
46. See Alice Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens- Limiting Anti-Terror
Meanues That Threaten Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (discussing the
principle of non-refoulment and its importance in refugee protection); see also U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on the
International Protection of Refugees, No. 6 (XXVIII), U.N. Doc. A/37/12/Add.1 (2009)
("Recalling that the fundamental humanitarian principle of non-refoulement has found
expression in various international instruments .... "); Cartagena Declaration on Refugees,
§ 3(5), Nov. 22, 1984, OAS Doc. OEA/SerJJV/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1 ("To reiterate the
importance and meaning of the principle of non-refoulement .. . as a corner-stone of the
international protection of refugees.").
47. See Kim, supra note 1 (discussing the President's role in immigration
adjudication).
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politicization of the process of appointing, reassigning, and removing
immigration adjudicators; new performance metrics for Us that create
improper incentives to issue swift deportation orders; and revised
training materials to "reeducate" asylum officers about the standards
for passing a credible fear interview, which is the first step in applying
for asylum.
Part IV then turns to executive interference in the prcess of
adjudication,focusing specifically on the Attorney General's power to
take over individual immigration cases and issue decisions that
overrule the Board. While agency head review is an accepted form of
policy making among administrative agencies, Part IV argues that
former Attorney General Sessions used the process to curtail
noncitizens' procedural rights rather than to make policy choices. Part
IV further argues that Sessions crossed the line between policy making
and prosecution by making decisions aimed at promoting deportation
rather than fair adjudication. Specifically, Sessions issued a series of
decisions that end the practice of administrative closure, heighten the
standard for obtaining a continuance, and facilitate summary dismissals
of asylum cases without a full hearing.
Part V argues that executive interference also takes the form of
preventing adjudicationfrm happening. The Trump Administration,
for example, has adopted policies that prohibit or deter asylum seekers
from exercising the statutory right to apply for asylum."' Policies to
turn asylum seekers away at ports of entry, criminally prosecute them,
and separate them from their children all fit into this category.
Although policies that prevent adjudication may be a more attenuated
form of executive interference than the actions described in Parts HI
and IV, they remain an important piece of the puzzle with significant
ramifications for the U.S. asylum system.
Lastly, Part VI explores ways to protect against executive
overreaching. This Part examines how the judiciary, Congress, and
agencies themselves can protect against undue presidential influence in
immigration adjudication.

48.
See Scott Horsley & Richard Gonzales, Thmp Adninistration Seeks to Limit
Asylum-Seekers with New Rule, NPR (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/1 1/08/
665875770/trump-administration-seeks-to-limit-asylum-seekers-with-new-rule.
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The President's power over immigration comes from several
sources, including inherent powers related to sovereignty and foreign
affairs, enumerated and implied constitutional powers, and powers
delegated by Congress in the INA. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized "the inherent power of a sovereign to close its borders,"
as well as to conduct "foreign relations and international commerce."'
Early immigration cases dating back to the late 1800s, including the
ChineseExclusion Case, invoke the doctrine of inherent powers to give
the political branches plenary power over the admission and exclusion
of noncitizens, rendering these decisions largely immune from judicial
review.50
In UnitedStates v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., a case arising in
the context of President Roosevelt's Embargo Proclamation on May
28, 1934, prohibiting the sale of arms in Bolivia and Paraguay, the
Supreme Court also found that the President has inherent power over
foreign affairs that exists independent of the Constitution.s" The Court
explained, "The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to
make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties,
if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have
vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality." 52 There, too, the Court stated, "[T]he power to expel
undesirable aliens ... exist[s] as inherently inseparable from the
conception of nationality."" Although commentators have criticized

.

49. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); see also United States ex rel. Knauffv.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (stating that the power to exclude noncitizens "is
inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation').
50. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889) (upholding the "power of exclusion of foreigners . . . [as] an incident of sovereignty');
see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) ("The right to . .. expel all
aliens ... [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation
. ... .); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It is an accepted maxim
of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, . .
to forbid the entrance of foreigners . . . .").
299 U.S. 304, 313, 318 (1936).
51.
52. Id at 318 (holding that a joint resolution delegating to the President authority to
criminalize foreign arms sales did not violate the non-delegation doctrine).
53. Id (citing Fong Yue 7ng, 149 U.S. at 705).
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Curtis-Wright as providing an anomalous or inaccurate description of
a government of limited powers, courts continue to rely on it."
Much more recent cases, such as 7-ump v. Hawaiiand Arizona v.
United States, confirm the political branches' plenary power over
immigration." Over the years, however, the Court has reined in the
plenary power by recognizing that it is subject to certain constraints.
For example, although noncitizens have no constitutional right to enter
the United States, the Court has engaged in a limited judicial inquiry
when their exclusion burdens the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens.
In this situation, the Court looks to see whether the executive has
provided a "facially legitimate and bona fide" reason for its action.57
The Court has stressed that this "narrow standard of review 'has
particular force' in admission-related cases that overlap with 'the area
of national security.""* While the Court has thus far declined to define
the precise contours of this inquiry, in reviewing the third version of
Trump's travel ban, it assumed, without deciding, that the "facially
legitimate and bona fide" standard permitted looking behind the face
of the ban "to the extent of applying rational basis review."' Under
rational basis review, the Court reasoned that the ban must be upheld
"so long as it can reasonably be understood to result from ajustification
54.
See, e.g., HAROLD HONou KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTrTON:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONIRA AFFAIR 94 (1990) ("Curtiss-Wright painted a
dramatically different vision of the National Security Constitution from that which has
WHITE, THE CONsTITION AND
THE NEW DEAL 75-76 (2000) ("Indeed, the logic of Sutherland's analysis in Curtiss-Wright
produced a stunning anomaly."); Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?,
70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1089, 1104-07 (1999) (predicting a shift away from foreign affairs
exceptionalism); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Co"s, Foreign Affairs, andFederalism, 83 VA.
L. REv. 1617, 1659-61 (1997) (rejecting Curtiss-Wright as authority for the federal common
law of foreign relations).
55. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418 (2018) ("For more than a century, this
Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a 'fundamental
sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from
judicial control."' (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977))); Arizona v. United States,
567 U.S. 387, 394-95 (2012). In Thonp, Justice Thomas's concurrence focuses on inherent
power far more than Justice Roberts's majority opinion. Compare Thamp, 138 S. Ct. at 240323 (making no reference to the President's inherent powers), with id at 2424 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("Section 1182(f) does not set forth any judicially enforceable limits that constrain
the President. Nor could it, since the President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from
the country." (citations omitted)).
56. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (majority opinion).
57. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,769 (1972).
58. Thmp, 138 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
59. Id at 2420.

prevailed since the founding of the Republic."); G. EDWARD
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independent of unconstitutional grounds."" Although the Court
recognized cases striking down policies under rational basis review
where there was evidence of animus against an unpopular group, it
found that the ban did not fit this pattern.61
When' it comes to executive policies pertaining to noncitizens
already inside the United States, rather than policies to exclude them,
the constitutional constraints on the executive are greater.62 Critically,
the Supreme Court has recognized that noncitizens in removal
proceedings have procedural due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment, since deportation involves a loss of liberty.- Due process
in removal proceedings requires a full and fair hearing, including, but
not limited to adequate notice of the proceeding, the right to be
represented by counsel at no expense to the government, 5 effective
assistance of counsel if the noncitizen is represented," adequate
translation of the proceedings 6 7 an unbiased adjudicator," the right not
60. Id at 2418-20.
61. Id at 2420-21.
62. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (finding that a noncitizen who has
gained admission has greater constitutional rights than one seeking admission); Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,77 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) ("It is well established that the
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings."); Mathews,
426 U.S. at 77 ("Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory
is entitled to that constitutional protection [of due process]."); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,
344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) ('It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident
of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person within the protection
of the Fifth Amendment."); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ('[D]eportation ...
deprives [a noncitizen] of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. ...
Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which [a noncitizen] is deprived of
that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.").
64. Khan v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that due process
requires notice of an immigration hearing that is reasonably calculated to reach the noncitizen).
65. Tawadrus v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Although there is no
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in an immigration hearing, Congress has recognized it
among the rights stemming from the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process that adhere to
individuals that are the subject of removal proceedings.").
66. Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
for individuals in removal proceedings).
67. He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Augustin v. Sava, 735
F.2d 32,36-37 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that an adequate translation of foreign documents is both
a statutory and constitutional right for asylum applications).
68. Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that the
noncitizen did not receive a full and fair hearing where the IJ showed prejudgment of the case
by excluding the testimony of several key witnesses); Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001,
1006 (9th Cir. 2003) ("A neutral judge is one of the most basic due process protections."
(quoting Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001))); Colmenar v. INS, 210
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to be pressured to withdraw an application,"' advice by the IJ on
apparent eligibility for relief from removal,70 an adequate explanation
of the procedures for the hearing,n a reasonable opportunity to testify,7 2
and a decision that provides a reasoned explanation and addresses the
arguments raised.73
Courts apply the three-part balancing test from Mathews v.
Eldridge to determine the scope of a noncitizen's procedural due
process rights in removal proceedings, just as in other types of
administrative proceedings. 7 4 In applying Eldridge,the Supreme Court
has distinguished procedures necessary to "meet the essential standard
of fairness under the Due Process Clause" from "choices of policy.""
For example, appellate courts have applied Eldridge in holding that
certain accelerated procedures for processing asylum claims violated
due process. 6
The executive is also constrained by the doctrine of separation of
powers. A fundamental aspect of that doctrine is that powers given to
Congress must not be usurped by the executive. Among the
enumerated powers related to immigration in the Constitution, most are
given to Congress. Congress has the authority to "establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization,"
"regulate Commerce with foreign
F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding a due process violation where "the U behaved not as a
neutral fact-finder interested in hearing the petitioner's evidence, but as a partisan adjudicator
seeking to intimidate Colmenar and his counsel").
69. Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that due
process was violated where the U pressured a pro se asylum applicant to withdraw his
application and accept voluntary departure, without an opportunity to testify at a hearing).
70.
United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(explaining that the court has repeatedly held that an U's failure to advise a noncitizen of
apparent eligibility for relief violates due process and can serve as the basis for a collateral
attack to a deportation order).
71.
Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[The U must adequately
explain the hearing procedures to the alien, including what he must prove to establish his basis
for relief.").
72. Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 971.
73. Su Hwa She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Due process and this
court's precedent require a minimum degree of clarity in dispositive reasoning and in the
treatment of a properly raised argument").
74. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). This test weighs the private interests at stake, the
government's interests, and the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interests without
the additional procedures at issue. Id; see also Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023,
1040 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying the test in Eldridge and concluding that Haitian asylum seekers
were "due more process than they received").
75. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982).
76. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 676 F.2d at 1039-40.
77. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cL 4.

2019]

EXECUTIVE OVERREACHING

721

Nations,"' "declare War,"' and prohibit "[t]he Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit."o Based on these enumerated powers, together
with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Supreme Court has stated
that 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens."'
However, the Constitution also gives the President certain
enumerated powers related to immigration and foreign affairs,
including the power to make treaties and receive ambassadors, which
is associated with the authority to conduct diplomacy.82 As the
Commander in Chief, the President also has military powers."
Consequently, the President's immigration power is at its peak during
national emergencies, when these Article II powers become directly
relevant." Even in national security cases that implicate foreign affairs
and military powers, however, the Supreme Court has applied due
process constraints.
Id §8, cl. 3.
78.
Id §8, cl. 11.
79.
80. Id 9, cL 1.
81. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.
v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cL 2.
83. Id §2, cl. 1.
84. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (recognizing "that
judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context
where officials 'exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of
foreign relations' (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988))); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) ("[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and
intricately interwoven with the contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government"); United
States er rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,546 (1950) ("Under the immigration laws
and regulations applicable to all aliens seeking entry into the United States during the national
emergency, she was excluded by the Attorney General without a hearing. In such a case we
have no authority to retry the determination of the Attorney General-"); see also BENJAMIN A.
KLENERMAN, THE DISCRETIONARY PRESIDENT THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF EXECUTIVE POWER

10 (2009) ("[T]he executive must prove, or at least attempt to prove, that [the exercises of
extra-constitutional power] were in fact necessary to the preservation of the nation."); ERIC A.
POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: -SECuRITY, LIBERTY, AND THE
COURTS 15-16 (2007) (describing the deferential and libertarian views of constitutional
emergency powers); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFrER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 3-18 (2010) (describing the extent and dominance of
executive power in crisis situations); Gary Lawson, OrdinayPowersin ExtraordinaryT"mes:
Comnon Sense in Tunes of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REv. 289, 293 (2007) (arguing that Posner and
Vermeule's arguments cohere with the original Constitution).
85. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537-38 (2004) (holding that due process
constrained the executive's ability to detain Hamdi without giving him the opportunity to rebut
the proffered evidence and noting that "[a]ny process in which the Executive's factual

722

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 93:707

Because the Supreme Court has never clearly defined the
allocation of immigration power between Congress and the President,
it is difficult to determine when the executive violates separation of
powers." Cases such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer offer
some guidance by providing a general formulation of separation of
powers." Under that formulation, the President's immigration power
is at its peak when aligned with Congress and at its lowest ebb when in
conflict with Congress."
In addition to the inherent and constitutional powers discussed
above, the executive has vast authority over immigration delegated by
Congress. A perceived national security threat triggers some of the
broadest delegations of power to the President in the INA," not to
mention delegations of power under other statutes that apply to
emergencies." For example, Congress delegated to the President the
power to "suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens" when
he or she "finds that [their] entry ... into the United States would be
detrimental to the interests of the United States."' This was the
statutory delegation of authority at issue in the travel ban case, and the

assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for
the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short"); Joseph Landau,
Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidere4 47 CONN. L. REv. 879, 913-22
(2015); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787-90 (2008) (holding that the review
mechanisms of the Detainee Treatment Act were an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus).
86.
Supreme Court cases tend to group Congress and the President together as the
political branches of government when discussing immigration. See, ag., Kerry v. Din, 135
S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) (noting that "the political branches[] [hold] broad power over the
creation and administration of the immigration system"); see also Cox & Rodrfguez, sipmn
note 1, at 460-61 (analyzing two different accounts of the history of the Supreme Court's
immigration jurisprudence); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The
President and Immigration Federaism, 68 FLA. L. REV. 101, 116 (2016) (noting "the
opportunities for divergent action, or even tension and conflict, between the two branches" and
explaining that 'c]larifying the division of responsibility between Congress and the President
has profound consequences for the viability of state and local immigration laws").
87. 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
88. Id at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012) (authorizing the President to suspend the entry of
immigrants "detrimental to the interests of the United States"); see also id § 1182(a)(3)(B)
(stating that those involved in "terrorist activities" are ineligible for a visa or admission into the
United States).
90.
See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2012) (empowering the executive to deport noncitizens
of the enemy state during times of war); id § 1702 (outlining the President's broad economic
powers during a national emergency).
91.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
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Court ultimately construed it as allowing Trump to suspend the entry
of individuals from six predominately Muslim countries.'
Despite the broad scope of the President's inherent, constitutional,
and delegated powers over immigration, there is one area where
Presidents have traditionally exercised constraint: adjudication. As
discussed below, the adjudication of individual immigration cases is
distinct from general policies regarding the admission and exclusion of
immigrants. Adjudication also represents an area where due process
protections are well-established and where the use of presidential
power to influence case outcomes would go against longstanding
conventions.
B.

Executive Influence in Adjudication

Commentators generally agree that presidential interference is
problematic in the context of administrative adjudication, as "even the
most ardent presidentialists have been careful to insist that the Chief
Executive could not intervene to direct the outcome of particular
cases." 93 For example, then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh wrote that when it
comes to direct presidential control, it "makes sense generally to treat
administrative adjudications differently from policy decisions,
rulemakings, and enforcement actions."" Before joining the Supreme
Court, then-Professor Elena Kagan observed that presidential
participation in executive branch adjudication would "contravene
procedural [due process] norms and inject an inappropriate influence
into the resolution of controversies."'
92.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2410-15 (2018); see also 8 U.S.C.

§ 1152(aX1XA) (prohibiting discrimination in the allocation of immigrant visas based on
nationality and other traits).
93. Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism,22
HARV. JL. & PuB. POL'Y 227, 233-34 (1998); see also Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and
Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMBTTE L. REv. 607, 616 n.39 (2009) (noting that "those
exercising discretion in quasi-adjudicative contexts" ought to be protected against at-will
removal by the President); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) FetteredExecutive: Presidential
Spinoffi in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REv. 801, 876-77 (2011)
("Simply put, the political accountability that generally legitimizes White House control over
the administrative state is not likely to ensure findamental fairness in individualized
decisions.").
94. Brett M. Kavanaugh, Separation ofPowers During the Forty-FourthPresidency
andBeyond 93 MINN. L. REV. 1454, 1474 (2009).
95. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2363 (2001)
(discussing Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), and Bi-Metallic Inv. Co.
v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), as well as the APA's stricter procedural
requirements for adjudication compared to rulemaking).
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While scholars widely agree that Presidents are constrained when
it comes to executive adjudication, they disagree about why Presidents
are constrained." Adrian Vermeule argues that the background norms
that constrain the President in this context are not related to due process,
as Kagan suggested, but to conventions, explaining that "presidential
direction of administrative adjudication would be seen as an
unprecedented exertion of power, violating longstanding unwritten
traditions, and would for that reason provoke a storm of protest."'
In an article titled The Morality of Administrative Law, Cass
Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule suggest that moral intuitions also act as
constraints in this context." They write that "judges possess widely
shared, inarticulate intuitions about administrative law's inner morality,
and recite 'due process' as a kind of shorthand or placeholder for such
intuitions," even though those intuitions may be "legally dubious or
unconvincing."'
They contend, for example, that precedents
prohibiting the President from having ex parte communications with
an agency official involved in administrative adjudication are based on
"unclear or at best highly contestable" legal reasoning. 10
What happens, then, if a President is elected who does not heed
conventions or moral intuitions? Is such a President free to interfere in
executive adjudication and direct the outcome of individual cases? Do
the procedural due process rights of noncitizens constrain the President
in this context? Immigration policies and decisions made by the Trump
Administration require us to grapple with these difficult questions. In
addition, we must consider the scope of immigration authority
exercised by executive leadership below the President, and what
constraints these officials face in matters of adjudication. That question
is discussed further below.

96. See Adrian Vermeule, Conventions ofAgency Independence, 113 CoLUM. L. REV.
1163, 1213 (2013).
97.
Id
98.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality ofAdministrative Law, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1961 (2018).
99. Id
100. Id at 1963 (discussing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), and Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993)). Sunstein and Vermeule characterize the reasoning in
such cases as circular because the executive position is that "the agency adjudicator is
ultimately exercising the President'sown power to execute the law, as a subordinate to the
President, so that it is a categorical mistake to see the President as 'interfering' in the decision
of the tribunal." Id
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Executive LeadershipBelow the President

Most of the executive branch's authority over immigration is
wielded through powerful administrative agencies.'o' The DOJ,
headed by the Attorney General, includes the EOIR, which
encompasses the immigration courts and the Board. These are the
adjudicators in removal proceedings. They make determinations about
who is inadmissible or deportable and have the authority to grant
different types of applications for relief from removal, including
applications for asylum.
DHS is another agency with enormous power over immigration
and includes several subagencies with different roles. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) is an agency within DHS that is responsible
for border security. CBP officers are often the first point of contact for
asylum seekers who present themselves at ports of entry along the U.S.Mexico border or who enter the United States illegally.'o2 One of the
most important duties of CBP officers is to conduct credible fear
screenings, which require asking certain questions to apprehended
individuals to determine if they fear being harmed in their home
country.10 3

DHS also includes U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), which is an agency that grants immigration benefits,
including, but not limited to, asylum, lawful permanent residence, and
citizenship. The Asylum Office is part ofUSCIS and conducts credible
fear interviews for individuals referred by CBP officers, as well as
regular asylum interviews.
In addition, DHS includes ICE, which is responsible for detention
and deportation. As law enforcement agents, ICE officers and
attorneys have prosecutorial discretion to decide whom to place in
removal proceedings, detain, and deport, based on priorities identified
by the President'" Shortly after becoming President, Trump issued an
101. See Developments in the Law-Immigration Rights & Immigration Enforcement,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1602 (2013) ("[Tihe executive's power over immigration has
increased with the rise of the modern administrative state and decline of the nondelegation
doctrine.").
102. See Robert Moore, Border Agents Are Using a New Weapon Against Asylum
Seekers, TEXAs MoNmLY (June 2,2018), https//www.texasmonthly.com/politics/immigrantadvocates-question-legality-of-latest-federal-tactics/.
103. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (2012).
104.

SHOBA

SIVAPRASAD

WADHIA,

BEYOND

DEPORTATION:

THE

ROLE

OF

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 7-13 (2015) (describing the extent of
prosecutorial discretion in the immigration system); Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 1, at 46263.
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executive order that dramatically changed the immigration
enforcement priorities adopted by President ObamaJos While Obama
focused primarily on deporting individuals with criminal convictions
and recent entrants, under Trump's policy, almost everyone lacking
legal status is a priority for deportation."
Although the INA gives extremely broad discretion to these
executive agencies," relatively little scholarship has explored the
constraints on this level of executive leadership below the President.10
An important insight offered by Catherine Kim is that plenary power
over immigration "is not freely delegable to unelected agency
officials,"" suggesting greater constraints on executive leadership
below the President than on the President himself.'"0
Scholars have also explored whether the President has directive
power when Congress gives authority to an agency head, rather than to
105. Exec. Order No. 13,768,82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30,2017).
106. Compare id at 8800 (implementing the alien removal policy), with Memorandum
from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf't, to All Field Office Dirs., All
Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel Regarding Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/
doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf (providing factors for
exercising prosecutorial discretion).
107. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396 (2012) (describing the "broad
discretion exercised by immigration officials" as a "principal feature" of the immigration
system); Catherine Y. Kim, PlenaryPower in the Modern A&ninistrative State, 96 N.C. L.
REV. 77, 96, 101 (2017) (arguing that "[n]owhere is the administrative exercise of
policymaking authority more evident than in the immigration context" and that "the power to
promulgate national immigration policy is increasingly exercised less by Congress, and more
by the officials populating our nation's administrative agencies"); see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(aX3) (authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to "perform such other acts as
he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter").
108. See Bijal Shah, The Attorney General'sDisrwptiveImmigrationPower, 102 IOWA
L. REV. 129, 154 (2017) (explaining that examining the potential overreach of the Attorney
General's use of the referral and review process adds "to the nascent study of how Executive
Branch leadership besides the President wields power in the immigration context" (footnote
omitted)).
109. Kim, supra note 107, at 115.
110. Some scholars have argued that plenary power does not apply to the President at
all, only to Congress. See John C. Eastman, The President'sPen andBureaucrat'sFiefdom,
40 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639,653 (2017) ("Absent some extraordinary foreign policy crisis
that would trigger the President's direct Article II powers over foreign affairs, the Constitution
assigns plenary power over immigration and naturalization to the Congress, not to the
President."); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,201 (1993) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (Congress .. .has plenary power over immigration matters."); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983) ("The plenary authority of Congress over aliens under Art. 1, § 8,
cl. 4, is not open to question... ."); Boutilierv. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) ("Congress has
plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens . . . ").

2019]

EXECUTIVE OVERREACHING

727

the President. Peter Strauss contends that "where Congress has
assigned a function to a named agency subject to its oversight and the
discipline of judicial review, the President's role-like that of the
Congress and the courts-is that of overseer and not decider."'
However, even if Presidents do not direct appointees to undertake
particular actions, they can simply make "requests" that convey their
preferences and expectations.112 Indeed, it is often assumed that this
type of presidential influence over agency heads takes place. As Nina
Mendelson observes, "Congress is likely to expect potentially
substantial presidential oversight of a wide range of executive branch
agency actions.""
Both Obama and Trump aggressively used their executive power
to implement major immigration policies, either directly through
executive orders or indirectly through agency heads."" For example,
under Obama, the DACA policy was adopted in a memorandum from
the Secretary of Homeland Security, not in an executive order issued
by the President, but was clearly based on the President's directives."
In many cases, the President's appointees share the President's policy
preferences, but there may be situations where these interests diverge.
Situations also inevitably arise where the preferences and priorities of
career staff within agencies diverge from those of appointed agency
heads. Jennifer Nou notes that "[o]ne of administrative law's anxieties
is the problem of authority delegated from more politically accountable
actors to the unelected ones within administrative agencies."" 6 But
111. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The Decider"? The Presidentin Administrative

Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 704-05 (2007) (emphasis added). But cf Cary Coglianese,
The Emptiness ofDecisionalLimits: Reconceiving PresidentialControlof the A&ninistrative

State, 69 ADMIN. L. REv. 43, 52 (2017) (arguing that we should "[d]isavow[] the overseerdecider distinction as a matter of law" and adopt a formal rule requiring agency heads to sign
off on actions delegated by the President).
112. Coglianese, supra note 111, at 70.
113. Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President'sStatutory Authority over
Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2455, 2459 (2011); see also Kagan, supra note 95, at
2251 ("[A] statutory delegation to an executive agency official . . . usually should be read as

allowing the President to assert directive authority, as Clinton did, over the exercise of the
delegated discretion.").
114. Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, PresidentialA&ninistration in a Regime of
SeparatedPowers:An Analysis ofRecent American Experience,35 YALE J. ON REG. 549, 551,
563-79 (2018) (describing "bold attempts to accrete executive power" in both the Obama and
Trump Administrations, including in the area of immigration, and arguing that proponents of
presidentialism overstate its benefits and understate its risks).
115. Idat563-64.
116. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under PresidentialReview, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1755, 1764 (2013) (arguing that resource-constrained agencies can resist presidential
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equally vexing is the problem of political interference into
adjudications normally handled by career staff.
Parts III through IV below explore three categories of executive
action where presidential power, exercised either directly by the
President or appointed agency heads, has interfered in immigration
adjudication. These categories involve political interference with
immigration adjudicators themselves, using the Attorney General
review mechanism to curtail procedural rights and promote
prosecution, and adopting policies that prevent adjudication from
taking place.
III. POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

WITH IMMIGRATION ADJUDICATORS

This Part discusses three forms of political interference with
immigration adjudicators that have become prominent under the
Trump Administration: politicized appointment, reassignment, and
removal of Us and Board members; politicized performance metrics
for Us to achieve a policy goal of swift deportations; and politicized
training materials for asylum officers to reduce positive credible fear
determinations and grants of asylum.
A.

PoliticizedAppointment, Reassignment, and Removal ofJudges

As mentioned in the introduction, civil service laws prohibit
discrimination in hiring for career positions, including based on
politics."' Since Us and Board members have career positions in the
DOJ, they are protected by these laws."s Nevertheless, under both the
Bush and Trump Administrations, politicized appointments became a
serious concern. In 2008, during the Bush Administration, an intemal
DOJ investigation concluded that high-ranking DOJ officials had
systematically violated civil services laws and DOJ policy "by
considering political or ideological affiliations in soliciting and
evaluating candidates" for positions as Us and Board members."'9
influence by increasing the costs of presidential review, thereby exercising a form of agency
"self-insulation" that disrupts a unitary vision of executive power).
117. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301(bX2), 2302(b)(1)(E) (2012).
118. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2302; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(bX4) (2012); 5 C.F.R.
§ 213.3101 (2018); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(aX2) (2018).
119. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLmIzED
HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

115 (2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0807/final.pdf (discussing violations that occuned
between 2004 and 2006); see also Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration
AdjudicationProblem,23 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 595,602-03,606-08 (2009) (discussing problems
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Instead of advertising vacant positions following normal hiring
procedures, DOJ officials directly identified candidates based on
recommendations from the White House and Republican members of
Congress.120
Over half of the IJs hired between 2004 and 2006 lacked any
immigration experience, suggesting they were hired based on their
politics rather than their professional qualifications.12' Among those
who had immigration experience, all were government prosecutors or
enforcement officers.1 2 2 In 2007, after an experienced government
immigration lawyer was denied a position as an IJ and sued the DOJ
for discrimination, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales suspended
the hiring of all Us and Board members and eventually approved a new
hiring process that returned responsibility for selecting judges to the
EOIR.' 23 However, the illegally appointed judges remained on the
bench.1 24
Political discrimination in the hiring of IJs and Board members
once again reared its ugly head under the Trump Administration. On
April 17, 2018, four members of Congress sent Attorney General
Sessions a letter expressing concerns that the DOJ was "using
ideological and political considerations to improperly-and illegallyblock the hiring of IJs and members of the Board of Immigration
Appeals."'25 The letter indicated that the DOJ had "delayed multiple
offers for these positions for unusually long amounts of time and, in

/

and litigation associated with a "politicized" approach to U hiring); Gabriel Pacyniak,
ControversyReemerges over Hiring, Review oflmmigrationJudges, 22 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 805,
805 (2008) (discussing "politicized hiring [and] systematic abuse ... in the screening and
selection of Immigration Judges and members of the BIA").
120. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 119, at 85-87.
121. See Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on
GOP Ties, WASH. POST (June 11, 2007), http://www.washingtonpostcom/wpyl/content/
article/2007/06/10/AR2007061001229.html; see also Richard B. Schmitt, ImmigrationJudges
26
Lack Apt Backgrounds, L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/
of
politicization
and
experience
nation/na-usattys26 (reporting the lack of immigration law
appointees).
federal immigration
122. Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 121.
123. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 119, at 114.
124. Stephen H. Legomsky, RestructuringImmigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635, 1666 (2010).
125. Letter from Elijah E. Cummings, Lloyd Doggett, Joaquin Castro, and Donald S.
Beyer Jr., Members of Cong., to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of20Justice2 (Apr. 17,2
to% 0DOJ%
2018), https*//cummings.house.gov/sites/cummings.house.gov/files/Dems%
Ore.%20EOIR%20Politicization.pdf.
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one case, withdrew an offer with an explanation that raises suspicions
about the actual motive for the withdrawal."l 2 6
The DOJ responded by denying any political motive and stating
that its needs had simply "evolved." 27 It proceeded to appoint all six
of the individuals concerned, but it failed to produce the requested
documents and never addressed the detailed allegations in the
Congressmen's letter.128
The qualifications to serve as an IJ still do not require any
immigration law experience.' 2 9 The "six quality ranking factors" that
applicants for IJ positions must address emphasize high-volume
litigation experience, which favors individuals with law enforcement
experience over private immigration attorneys who tend to handle a
more diverse caseload.' 3 0 These hiring criteria provide more subtle
ways to politicize appointments.
Politics has influenced not only appointments, but also the
reassignment and removal of Us and Board members. Reassignment
is not considered disciplinary as long as there is no loss in pay or grade,
but it can be used in punitive or political ways, especially if it involves
being moved to a less desirable part of the country or taken off the
bench and given desk duties.13 '
In 2003, under the Bush
126. Id.
127. Tal Kopan, ImmigrationJudgeApplicant Says TrumpAdministrationBlocked Her
over Politics, CNN (June 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/21/politicsimmigration-

judge-applicant-says-trump-administmtion-blocked-her-over-politics/index.html.

&

128. Press Release, House Comm. on Oversight & Reform, Reps. Doggett
Cummings: DOJ Response to Whistleblower Immigration Judge Inquiry Fails to Address
Allegations and Renews Concerns of Politicization (June 7, 2018), https://democratsoversight.house.gov/news/press-releases/eps-doggett-cummings-doj-rsponse-to-whistleblowerimmigration-judge-inquiry
129. See Kathryn Troutman, Attorneys with 7 Years Post-Bar Experience Wanted
Urgently for Immigration Judges, RESuME PLACE (May 17, 2018), https-//www.resuneplace.conv 2 018/05/attorneys-wanted-urgently-for-immigration-judges/.
Applicants must
address six quality ranking factors, which include "[k]nowledge of immigration laws and
procedures, if any." Id (emphasis added). The instructions state, "[I]f you do not have
immigration experience, write about other knowledge of laws and procedures." Id (emphasis
omitted).
130. Id.
131. Legomsky, supra note 6, at 373-74; see also Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the
ImmigrationBench: An Ethical Perspective,28 J.NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JuDIcIARY 471, 518
(2008) ("Given recent examples of political removals ... immigration judges are left with an
'emerging fear that ruling against the government in a deportation case can be hazardous
to
one's job."' (quoting Legomsky, supra note 6, at 373-74)). For example, in March 2008,
Immigration Judge Jeffrey Chase was "reassigned" to a desk job and relieved of courtroom
duties. See Nina Bernstein, US. Relieves Judge ofDuties in Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/13/nyregion/13judge.html.
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Administration, Attorney General John Ashcroft reassigned Board
members whose decisions tended to favor noncitizens rather than
DHS.1 3 2 Although Ashcroft defended his decision to shrink the Board
as streamlining its work, Us viewed the firings as politically
motivated.' 3 3 The Honorable Dana Leigh Marks, who was then the
president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, called it
"selective downsizing" and expressed concern that it would have a
34
"chilling effect" on independent decision making.1
Just as downsizing the Board is a way to shift its political balance,
so is expanding it In 2015, the DOJ increased the maximum number
of Board members from fifteen to seventeen.'1 3 Before Trump took
office, the Board had sixteen full-time members. Eleven of those
sixteen members had been appointed by Attorney Generals-selected by
Democratic Presidents.'1 3 In 2018, the DOJ published a final rule
increasing the number of Board members from sixteen to twenty-one,
allowing five additional Board members to be appointed, which could,.
"correct" the Board's political imbalance, although the proclaimed,
37
purpose of the expansion was to reduce the backlog of cases.'
The Trump Administration has also attempted to use the
reassignment of IJs to meet its policy goal of ramping up deportations,
or at least to create the optics of achieving that goal. In 2017, one-third
of all Us were uprooted from their regular positions and temporarily
reassigned to "border courts" to demonstrate the Administration's
commitment to border enforcement, even though this delayed cases in
their home courts.1 38 The reality for many judges deployed to border,
132. Family, supranote 119, at 602-03; Legomsky, supranote 6, at 375-76; see Ricardo
Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration BoardAsked to Leave; Critics Call
It a 'Purge,'L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/12/nation/naimmigl2.
133. See Complaint at 17-19, Tabaddor v. Holder, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1076 (C.D. Cal.
2015) (No. 14-cv-06309); Family, supra note 119, at 602-03; Tara Lundstrom, LastingLessons
from the Border Surge: It's Time We Fundan Independent Immigration Court System, FED.
LAWYER, Jan.Feb. 2015, at 3, 5.
134. Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority:Why Congress Should Establishan
Article Ilmmigration Court, 13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 3-4, 10-11, 14 (2008).
135. Expanding the Size of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,461
(June 3, 2015).
136. Andrew R. Arthur, Expand the Boardoflmmigration Appeals, Cr. FOR IMMIGR.
STUD. (July 26, 2017), https*//cis.org/Arthur/Expand-Board-Immigration-Appeals.
137. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(aX1) (2018); see also Expanding the Size of the Board of
Immigration Appeals, 83 Fed. Reg. 8321, 8321 (Feb. 27, 2018) ("The [DOJ] is taking steps to
address the unprecedented pending caseload. The [DOJ] hired 64 additional immigration
judges in FY 2017 and continues to hire new immigration judges.").
138. Statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supranote 8, at 3.
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courts was that they had "no work to do and faced malfunctioning
equipment, often with no internet connection, or files." 39
One of the most controversial decisions that the DOJ made under
the Trump Administration was to remove a specific case from an U and
substitute a different judge in order to achieve a particular outcome.
The National Association of Immigration Judges accused the Trump
Administration of transferring the case of Renaldo Castro-Tum from
Immigration Judge Steven Morley in Philadelphia because he did not
issue a deportation order.'" In 2010, when Castro-Turn was an
unaccompanied minor who failed to show up in court, Judge Morley
administratively closed his case because he was not confident that
Castro-Tum had received proper notice of the hearing.14 ' The
government filed an appeal, which the Board granted, ordering Judge
Morley to reopen the case. In May 2017, Attorney General Sessions
stepped in, certifying the case to himself for a decision'4 2 and using it
to limit the general authority of Us to administratively close cases, as
discussed in Part IV below.
Upon remand, when Judge Morley granted a continuance instead
of issuing a deportation order, a manager at the EOIR reassigned the
case to an assistant chief U, who traveled to the Philadelphia
Immigration Court to conduct a single hearing and order Castro-Tum
deported.1 43 Judge Morley subsequently discovered that the EOIR had
also reassigned over eighty of his other cases where he had questioned
whether unaccompanied minors had received adequate notice of their
hearings.'" The union for Us filed a grievance demanding that the
EOIR return Judge Morley's cases to him and issue a written statement
acknowledging that cases should not be reassigned in a way that
undermines the independence of Js.' 45 An open letter signed by fifteen
former Us and Board members condemned the EOIR's "interference
139. Id
140. Antonio Olivo, ImmigrationJudges, Worried Trunp Is Seeking to Cut Them Out,
Fight Back, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2018), https//www.washingtonpostcom/local/socialissues/immigration-judges-worried-trump-is-seeking-to-cut-them-out-fight-back/2018/08/09/
3d7e915a-9bd7-1 le8-8d5e-c6c594024954_story.html; see alsoElise Foley, ImmigrationJudges
Union Slams Trump Administrationfor Undermining Courts, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8,
2018), https-//www.huffingtonpostcomi/entry/immigration-judges-sessions-us 5b6b0128e4b
Ode86f4a774ef ("[T]he agency usually only applies [reassignment] for administrative reasons,
such as if ajudge retires or goes on leave.").
141. Foley, supra note 140.
142. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 1. & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018).
143. See Olivo, supranote 140.
144. Id
145. Id
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with judicial independence" as "unacceptable."l4 The letter states, "In
the absence of another explanation, it would seem that EOIR's
management did not believe Sessions' purpose in remanding the case
was for an IJ to then exercise independent judgment to ensure due
process."1 47 Noting that the EOIR had "removed the case from the
docket of a capable judge in order to ensure an outcome that would
please its higher-ups," the statement concluded that "we expect our
judges to reach results based on what is just, even where such results
are not aligned with the desired outcomes of politicians."l4 8
Politicized appointments, reassignments, and removal of IJs is the
most obvious way that the executive improperly influences
adjudication. But it is not the only way. As discussed below,
performance metrics and training materials are also being used to
politicize immigration adjudicators and sway the outcome of cases
towards deportation.
B.

PoliticizedPerformanceMetrics to PromoteDeportations

A second way that the executive can interfere politically with
immigration adjudicators is by using performance evaluations of
judges to achieve policy goals. Unlike ALJs, who are exempt from
performance evaluations under the APA due to the nature of their
duties, 149 Us have been evaluated for over a decade using the traditional
federal employee performance review system. This process is not
public, does not consider outside input, and "can result in career-ending
discipline to a Judge who makes a good faith legal decision that his or
her supervisor considers to be insubordinate."so
Under the Bush and Obama Administrations, the EOIR set courtwide case completion goals to allocate resources and address the
backlog of cases."' While this put some pressure on Us to complete
cases efficiently, case completion quotas were not part of their
individual performance reviews.s2 In fact, the EOIR prohibitedrating
judges on that basis, recognizing that quotas conflict with an U's duty
146. Jeffrey S. Chase, Statement of Former Immigration Judges and BIA Members,
OPINIONs/ANALYSIS ONIMMIGR. L. (July 30,2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/
7/30/statement-of-former-immigmtion-judges-and-bia-members.
147. Id
148. Id
149. See 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012).
150. Statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 8, at 5.
151. See id at 7.
152. Id
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to exercise independent judgment in each case and that strict timelines
could compromise an immigrant's right to a full and fair hearing." 3
This process changed under the Trump Administration. In March
2018, the EOIR announced new performance metrics that threaten to
undermine the independence and integrity of Us by pressuring them to
complete cases quickly at the expense of ensuring a fair process."
Under this new system, which took effect on October 1, 2018, the
performance of an U is deemed unsatisfactory or in need of
improvement if the judge completes fewer than 700 cases per year,
completes less than 95% of credible fear and reasonable fear reviews
at the first hearing, or has over 15% of cases remanded on appeal.155
These performance metrics were adopted despite vehement
opposition by the National Association of Immigration Judges.15 ' The
President of the organization, Judge A. Ashley Tabaddor, described the
individual production quotas as "tantamount to transforming a judge
into an interested party in the proceedings."157 In her testimony to
Congress, she pointed out that the metrics create financial conflicts of
interest for IJs, whose livelihoods will depend on decisions about
whether to grant a continuance or hear additional testimony that would
delay completing a case.' 5 She observed, "Immigration Judges will
become bean-counting employees instead of fair and impartial judges,
and their supervisors will become traffic cops monitoring whether the
Similarly, former
cases are completed at the correct speed."'
completion
quotas
Jeffrey
Chase
opined
that
the
Immigration Judge

153. Id
154. Memorandum from James McHenry, Dir., Exec. Office for Immigration Review,
to All EOIR Judges Regarding Immigration Judge Performance Metrics (Mar. 30, 2018),
https/A/www.aila.org/mfonet/eoir-memo-immigration-judge-performance-metrics.
155. Id; see also Exec. Office for Immigration Review, EOIR Performance Plan:
Adjudicative Employees, httpsJ//aila.org/mfonet/eoir-memo-immigration-judge-performancemetrics (describing satisfactory and unsatisfactory performance standards for Us).
156. NAT'L Ass'N OF IMMIGRATION JUDGgs, NAIJ HAS GRAvE CONCERNs REGARDING
IMPLEMENTATION OF QUOTAS ON IMMIGRATION JUDGE PERFORMANCE REVIEWs (2017), https//

wwwnaij-usa.orgmages/uploadstpublicationsNAIJ - Concerns Regarding Implementation
_ofQuotas 10-17-17.pdf (prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee Oversight Hearing on
the Department of Justice on October 18, 2017).
157. Statement of.J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supranote 8, at 7.
158. Id at 7-8; see also Jeffrey S. Chase, EOIR Imposes Completion Quotas on Ifs,
OPINIONs/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/
4f7/eoir-imposes-completion-quotas-on-ijs ("Fair-minded judges who will continue to hold
full hearings and consider legal arguments in favor of granting relief may find it more difficult
to meet all ofthe above benchmarks.").
159. Statement ofJ. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supranote 8, at 10.
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were "likely designed to pressure judges with more liberal approaches
into issuing more removal orders."o
By increasing the pressure on Us to deny continuances in order to
achieve case completion goals, the new performance metrics also
create potential conflicts with appellate court precedents. For example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
"[t]o reach a decision about whether to grant or deny a motion for a
continuance based solely on case-completion goals, with no regard for
the circumstances of the case itself is impermissibly arbitrairy." 6 1 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuit have
similarly reversed cases where the denial of a continuance was based,
even in part, on an U's expressed need to proceed expeditiously and
achieve case completion goals.162 Us fearing disciplinary action for not
achieving case-completion goals may now be deterred from allowing
any type of delay, even if delay is necessary to ensure a fair outcome.'
Under Obama, ICE based deportation officers' performance
metrics on the number of cases they processed or charged, and "the
pressure to hit these metrics pervasively shaped the work of the
agency's front-line operators."'" Now the Trump Administration is
doing the same thing to Us. The difference is that deportation officers'
job is to pursue deportation, whereas an U's job requires being an
impartial adjudicator and making fair decisions based on the law. By
rewarding the Us who issue swift deportation orders and penalizing
those who do not, the new performance metrics politicize adjudicators
and undermine their independence.

160. Jeffery S. Chase, Us, 7leredReview, andCompletion Quotas, OPINIONs/ANALYSIS
ONIMMIoR. L. (Nov. 9,2017), https*//www.jefreyschase.com/blog/2017/11/9/ijs-tiered-reviewand-completion-quotas/; see also Letter from Jill E. Family et al., to Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att'y
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Aug. 14, 2018), https//commonwealthlaw.widener.eduffiles/
resources/letter-to-sessions-immigration-adjudication-with-s.pdf (raising concerns that the
new performance metrics "will diminish independence in immigration adjudication as
immigration judges will now have a personal stake in the outcome of cases").
161. Hashmi v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 531 F.3d 256,261 (3d Cir. 2008).
162. See Keller v. Filip, 308 F. App'x 760, 763 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding that the Board
erred in afiming the U's denial of a continuance that was based on the 'judge's fear of
repercussions for violating case completion goals set by her superiors'); Badwan v. Gonzales,
494 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that an U cannot deny a motion for continuance
solely based on a need to adjudicate expeditiously).
163. Chase, supranote 158.
164. Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals?Discretion, Sorting andBureaucraticCulture
in the U.S. ImmigrationSystem, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUsT. 195, 225 (2014).
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PoliticizedTrainingMaterialsfor Asylum Officers

A third way that the executive has influenced immigration
adjudication is by politicizing legal training materials for asylum
officers. Both the Obama and Trimp Administrations revised legal
training materials around credible fear interviews to achieve policy
goals. Immigrants who request asylum at a port of entry or who are
apprehended after entering illegally and express a fear of persecution
in their country of origin should go through a credible fear screening
process to determine if they deserve an opportunity to submit a full
asylum application. 65
A CBP officer initially asks questions to screen for credible fear.16
Immigrants who express a credible fear are referred to a USCIS asylum
officer for a credible fear interview.1 6 1 Those who pass the credible fear
interview are placed in a removal proceeding and given a chance to
apply for asylum in immigration court."' Those who fail the credible
fear interview can submit a request for reconsideration to the asylum
officer or seek review of the negative credible fear determination by an
U.169 Otherwise, they are subject to expedited removal, meaning they

are deported without a court hearing. 170
Congress introduced expedited removal and the credible fear
process in legislation enacted in 1996."' The INA defines a "credible
fear of persecution" as "a significant possibility, taking into account the
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien's
claim and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien
could establish eligibility for asylum."1 72 In 1997, when the DOJ

165. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(AXii) (2012).
166. Id
167. Id; id § 1225(bX)(B)(i).
168. Id § 1225(bX)(1XBXii).
169. Id § 1225(bXIXBXiii)(II); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(gX2) (2018).
170. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(BXiii)(I).
171. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
172. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(bXl)(BXv). A similar process called a "reasonable fear
determination" is used for people with prior removal orders. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(b). The main
difference is that individuals with prior deportation orders are only eligible for withholding of
removal, not asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 123 (aX5). Withholding ofremoval is very similar to asylum
but has a higher burden of proof requiring the individual to demonstrate a greater than fifty
percent chance of future persecution. Unlike asylum, it does not create a path to permanent
residence or citizenship.
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introduced a rule to implement those statutory provisions, it chose not
to further define credible fear.'
The DOJ explained that, instead, immigration officials would
receive "extensive training" on "the purpose of the credible fear
standard and how it is to be applied to particular cases" in order to
"ensure that the standard is implemented in a way which will
encourage flexibility and a broad application of the statutory
standard."l74 The Obama and Trump Administrations, however, each
revised the training materials for immigration officers to provide an
increasingly lessflexible andheightened standard for credible fear."'
In 2014, under the Obama Administration, the USCIS revised its
training materials for asylum officers on credible fear determinations
in response to an escalating number of credible fear referrals caused by
the surge of Central American asylum seekers.' Between Fiscal Year
(FY) 2009 and FY2014, the number of credible fear interviews
completed by asylum officers increased nearly ten-fold, from around
5275 to 47,870.177 Similarly, the number of credible fear reviews by
Us increased nearly eight-fold from 861 to 6483 during that time
period.17 The revised lesson plan required asylum officers to find the
asylum seeker's testimony to be credible, persuasive, and specific in

173. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens;
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,317 (Mar. 6,
1997).
174. Id (emphasis added).

175. U.S.

CrrIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVs., ASYLUM DIVSION OFFICER TRAINING

COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR 13-14 (2014), httpi//cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/credible-fear-ofpersecution-and-torture.pdf; Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., to Kevin McAleenan, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot, et al. Regarding
Implementing the President's Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvement
Policies 6-7 (Feb. 20,2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17 0220 Sl

&

Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-ImprovementPolicies.pdf
176. See Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chiet Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship
Immigration Servs., to Asylum Office Dirs. et al. Regarding Release of Updated Asylum
Division Officer Training Course (ADOTC) Lesson Plan (Feb. 28, 2014), https*//www.aila.
org/infonet/uscis-asylum-revised-credible-fear-lesson-plan.
177. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., TOTAL CREDIBLE FEAR CASES COMPLETED: FISCAL
YEARS 2007 To 2016, htps*/www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/readingroom/RFA/crediblefear-cases-interview (last visited Feb. 12,2019).
178. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014
STATISTICS YEARBOOK BL (2015), https*//www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/
16/fyl4syb.pdf, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013
STATISTICS YEARBOOK B1 (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/
2014/04/16/fyl3syb.pdf.
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order to satisfy the "significant possibility" standard.17 ' The guidance
further instructed officers that claims with a "minimal or mere
possibility, of success" do not satisfy the standard." But in cases
"[w]hen there is reasonable doubt regarding the outcome of a credible
fear determination," the guidance instructed asylum officers to find in
favor of the noncitizen.''

The number of credible fear interviews by asylum officers
continued to increase in the final years of the Obama Administration,
ballooning to 91,786 in FY2016, s2 while the number of credible fear
reviews by Us increased to 7469.181 Within days of becoming
President, Trump issued an executive order that discussed expanding
the use of expedited removal.'" The following month, in February
2017, the USCIS again revised its lesson plan on credible fear
determinations.' The Trump Administration asserted that the purpose
of the revisions was to prevent abuse of the system.1 6 Additionally, a
memo from John Kelly, then Secretary of Homeland Security, claimed
that "[t]he surge of illegal immigration at the southern border has
overwhelmed federal agencies and resources and has created a
significant national security vulnerability to the United States." 87
While the 2014 guidance had stressed that asylum officers do not
make final credibility determinations because the credible fear
determination is preliminary, the 2017 guidance requires officers to
make credibility determinations, instructing them to consider "the same
factors considered in evaluating credibility in the affirmative asylum
context." 88 The 2017 guidance also directs asylum officers to give
more weight to any inconsistencies with the applicant's initial
179. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IlMIGRATION SERvs., supra note 175, at 13-14.
180. Id at 14 (emphasis omitted).
181. Id at 16.
182. U.S. DEP'TOF HOMELAND SEC., supranote 177.
183. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, FY 2016
STATSTICS YEARBOOK B1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/fide/fysbl6/download.

&

184. Exec. Order No. 13,767,82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30,2017).
185. Katie Shepherd, These Changes MayKeepAsyhwn Seekersfmm Getting TheirDay
in Court, IMMIGR. IMPACr (Feb. 28, 2017), http*//immigrationimpact.com/2017/02/28/
changes-may-kee
isylum-seekers-getting-day-court/.
186. See Alfonso Chardy, Toughened Asylwn Prcess for Immigrants Is Part of an
Effort to Prwent Fraud Authorities Say, MIAMI HERALD (May 2, 2017), http//wwwimiami
herald.com/news/local/immigration/articlel47492484.hitmL
187. Memorandum from John Kelly to Kevin McAlleenan, supra note 175, at 6-7.
188. Memorandum from John Lafferty, Chief Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship
Immigration Serys., to all Asylum Office Personnel Regarding Release of Updated Asylum
Division Officer Training Course (ADOTC) Lesson Plans 19 (Feb. 13,2017) [hereinafter 2017
Lesson Plan on Credible Fear], https*//www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/709O6.
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statement to the CBP."' However, reports by the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom document that the CBP frequently
fails to ask the requisite credible fear questions and fails to record
responses accurately.1 " In addition, the 2017 guidance raises the
standard for establishing identity to a "preponderance of the
evidence."191 Finally, the 2017 guidance deletes the language added in
2014 about making a positive credible fear determination in cases
where there is a reasonable doubt1
Human Rights First has argued that the new guidance heightens
the standard for establishing credible fear." After the USCIS
implemented this new lesson plan, the percentage of cases where
asylum officers found credible fear dropped from 78% in February
2017 to 68% in June 2017, consistent with a heightened standard.'9
The percent of cases where Us reversed a credible fear denial
plummeted even more dramatically, from over 30% in the last six
months of 2017 to under 15% by June 2018.195 These changes indicate
that the revisions in the training materials affected the interpretation
and application of the statutory credible fear standard by asylum
officers and Us. In other words, the training materials that were revised
to achieve certain policy goals effectively changed the legal standard
and directly impacted adjudication, although Congress never revised
the definition of credible fear.
189. Id at 21.
190. ELZABETH CASSIDY & TIFFANY LYNCH, U.S. CoMM'N ON INT'L RELGIOUS
FREEDOM, BAIUERS TO PROTECTION: THE TREAThENr OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDrrED
REMOVAL 20-23 (2016); MARKHETFIELDETAL, U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 57 (2005); see also HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRSr, How TO PROTEcr REFUGEES AND PREVENT ABUSE AT THE BORDEL BLUEPRINT FOR U.S.
GOVERNMENr PoLIcY 12 (2014), http-1/www hmaightsfirstorg/sites/default/files/Asylum-

on-the-Border-final.pdf ('In approximately haif of inspections observed by USCIRF
researchers, inspectors failed to inform the immigrant of the information in [the credible fear]
part of the script"). The Board ignored these reports in Matter ofJ-C-H-F-, 27 1. & N. Dec.
211 (B.I.A. 2018), which addressed the criteria that an U should use in assessing the reliability
of a statement taken at the border or at an airport.
191. 2017 Lesson Plan on Credible Fear, supra note 188, at 17.
192. Id at 21; see Katherine Shattuck, Comment, Preventing Erroneous Expedited
Removals: ImmigrationJudgeReview andRequestsforReconsiderationon Negative Credible
FearDeterminations,93 WASH. L. REV. 459, 489 (2018).
193. See HUMAN RIGHTs FIRST, CREDIBLE FEAR. A SCREENING MECHANISM IN

EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2018), https*//www.humanrightsfirstorg/sites/defaul/files/Credible
Fearj_Feb 2018.pdf.
194. Id
195. TRANSACHONAL RECORDs ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, FINDINGS OF CREDIBLE FEAR
PLUMMET AMID WIDELY DISPARATE OUTCOMES BY LOCATION AND JUDGE (2018),

http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/523/.
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The Trump Administration has made no secret of its policy goal
of reducing the number of asylum cases in immigration court and its
skepticism of the credible fear process. President Trump and former
Attorney General Sessions have both described the credible fear
process as a "loophole" in our laws." In an October 2017 speech to
the EOIR, Sessions dismissed the credible fear process as "an easy
ticket to illegal entry into the United States."'" He claimed that
"vague, insubstantial, and subjective" asylum applications have
"swamped our system."'"9
Sessions explicitly stated his goal to
"elevate the threshold standard of proof in credible fear interviews" and
claimed that asylum was being granted in meritless cases." Secretary
of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen has also explicitly stated her
goal of "tighten[ing] case processing standards, including the 'crediblefear' standard."2
In short, by simply revising the training materials on credible fear
determinations, the Trump Administration achieved its goal of
elevating the standard of proof without going through the normal
rulemaking process or having Congress amend the statute.
IV. ExEcuTIvE INTERFERENCE iN AGENCY ADJUDICATION

While Part HI discussed the politicization of adjudicators,this
Part examines how the Attorney General review mechanism can be
used to politicize the process of adjudication. The following sections
describe the Attorney General review mechanism and argue that former
Attorney General Sessions misused this process. While the purpose of
the review mechanism is to allow a political appointee to make difficult
policy choices, Sessions used it to curtail noncitizens' procedural rights
and facilitate prosecution.

196. President Donald I. Trump, State of the Union Address (Jan. 30, 2018), httpsJ/
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-tumps-state-union-address/.
197. Att'y Gen. Jeff Sessions, supra note 30.
198. Id
199. Id
200. Oversight ofthe United States Department ofHomeland Security. Hearing Before

S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 1 (2018) (statement of Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec'y,
Dep't of Homeland Sec.), https*//www.judiciary.senate.gov/imomedia/doc/01-16-18%20
Nielsen/620Testimony.pdf.
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The Attorney GeneralReview Mechanism

Agency head review exists in many agencies and is a generally
accepted practice.20 1 It is seen as a way for a politically accountable
figure to maintain control over important policy issues that may arise
in individual cases or that are simply easier to address through
adjudication than the more time-consuming rulemaking process.2 02 It
is also touted as promoting consistency in agency adjudication.20 3
Under regulations issued by the DOJ, the Attorney General has
the power to review Board cases that are referred to him by the Board
or by DHS, or that he certifies to himself.2" Before 1956, Attorney
Generals often used the review mechanism to summarily affirm or
deny Board decisions.205 Since then, however, the review mechanism
has been rarely used.2 06 Nevertheless, this mechanism has proven to be
a powerful tool with important ramifications.2 0
The Attorney General review mechanism has been criticized for
many reasons. As some commentators point out, the relative lack of
immigration subject matter expertise by the Attorney General
compared to members of the Board, the Attorney General's focus on

201. Ronald A. Cass, Allocation of Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical
Evidence andNormativeAnalysis, 66 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986); Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication
in Independent Tribunals: The Role ofan Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 965, 970 (1991); Laura S. Trice, Ajudication by Fiat: The Need for Procedural
Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1768 (2010); Russell L. Weaver, Appellate Review in Executive
DepartmentsandAgencies, 48 ADMIN. L. REv. 251,252-53 (1996).
202. Weaver, supra note 201, at 294. Of course, this can also be seen as an end-run
around rulemaking that deprives affected individuals the opportunity to provide input through
the notice-and-comment process. Id ("Since agency heads are free to declare policy through
adjudication, they have less incentive to articulate policy legislatively."); see also 5 U.S.C.
§§ 553(b)-(c) (2012) (explaining that informal rulemaking requires the agency to give
interested parties notice and an opportunity to respond, and requires the agency to respond to
the comments that it receives).
203. See Hon. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch
ImmigrationPolicy Through the Attorney General'sReview Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841,
856-57 (2016).
204. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2018).
205. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 203, at 857-58.
206. Id at 858-59.
207. Id (discussing how the mechanism has been used to change immigration law and
policy); see also Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and
EnforcingFederalLaw, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 619,639 n.89 (2012) (calling the mechanism a
"powerful tool").

742

TULANE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 93:707

enforcement, and Us' unique status as the only judges within the DOJ
undermine the usual arguments for agency head review.20 8
One significant criticism ofAttorney General review is that it can
occur without the meaningful participation of the parties, creating a
perception ofunfaimess.2 " The Attorney General may exercise review
without giving notice to the parties, identifying the issues that he or she
plans to address, or providing an opportunity for briefing by the parties
or amici curiae.210
Second, because the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL)
within the DOJ represents DHS in immigration appeals pending before
the federal courts, there are concerns about OIL recommending
certification of cases to the Attorney General in order to advance its
own litigation positions. 2 1 1 Attorney Generals have self-certified old
and unpublished Board decisions that did not even raise the issues
ultimately addressed,2 12 raising questions about how the Attorney
General even became aware of these cases, much less selected them for
certification, without consulting with OIL or DHS.
Third, commentators have argued that Attorney General review
disrupts the coherent development of immigration law. Bilal Shah
persuasively demonstrates that immigration decisions by Attorney
Generals under the Bush and Obama Administrations unsettled judicial
doctrine, disrupted the traditional application of legislative standards,
and changed longstanding agency practices. 2 13 For example, Attorney
Generals adopted and elevated a minority court's view when faced with
a circuit split, interrupted the development of circuit court case law by
vacating prior Attorney General decisions, and adopted new
208. Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylun and the
Limits to Consistency,60 STAN. L. REV. 413,458 (2007); Jeffrey S. Chase, TheAG's Certfying
of BIA Decisions, OPINIONs/ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.jeffreys
chase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-certifying-of-bia-decisions.
209. See Trice, supra note 201, at 1773-74. Concerns about lack of participation are
not unique to the immigration context. See Weaver, supra note 201, at 290 ("The major
problem with agency review is that the agency head's review is often the most meaningful part
of the adjudicative process, but litigants often have little opportunity to participate.").
210. See Gonzales & Glen, supranote 203, at 913.
211. See Memorandum ofLaw forAmici CuriaeAmerican Immigration Lawyers Ass'n
et al at 9-10, Matter of Silva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008) (No. A013 014 303)
[hereinafter AILA Memorandum]; see also Weaver, supra note 201, at 293 ("Tlhe agency
head may consult with many different people within the agency. Parties outside the agency
will generally know little about who discussed what with whom, and may question the fairmess
of the process.").
212. AILA Memorandum, supranote 211, at 10.
213. Shah, stpranote 108, at 143.
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interpretations of the statute that resulted in circuit splits and
destabilized agency norms.2 14
Fourth, Attorney General review raises pressing questions about
the appropriateness of making decisions on political rather than legal
grounds.2 15 The use of Attorney General review to advance partisan
goals is undisputed. A law review article authored by former Attorney
General Alberto Gonzalo and Patrick Glen openly acknowledges that
the referral and review mechanism is a political tool used to advance
the President's immigration policies. 216 The partisan nature of the
review mechanism is also highly visible to the public, as Democratic
and Republican Attorney Generals have reversed each other on
numerous issues, such as the appropriate standard for demonstrating
that a noncitizen received ineffective assistance of counsel, 217 how to
determine whether a conviction constitutes a "crime involving moral
turpitude" under the INA,218 and whether asylum may be granted based
on domestic violence.2 19
While these criticisms are longstanding, former Attorney General
Sessions pushed the use of the review mechanism to a new extreme,
raising more serious concerns about the process than ever before. In

214. Id at 143-152.
215. Id
216. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 203, at 843-47, 920.
217. Democratic Attorney General Eric Holder vacated Republican Attorney General
Michael Mukasey's decision heightening the standard for establishing that a noncitizen
received ineffective assistance of counsel. See Matter of Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2-3
(A.G. 2009), vacating 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 731 (A.G. 2009) (holding that ineffective assistance
must be "egregious").
218. Democratic Attorney General Holder vacated Republican Attorney General
Mukasey's decision lowering the bar determining that a conviction constitutes a crime
involving moral turpitude by allowing immigration judges to consider all types of evidence
instead of limiting them to the record of conviction. See Matter of Silva-Trevino, 26 1. & N.
Dec. 550, 553 (AG. 2015), vacating 24 L & N. Dec. 687 (AG. 2008).
219. Democratic Attorney General Janet Reno vacated a Board decision denying
asylum based on domestic violence and ordering the Board to reconsider the case after the
issuance of regulations for gender-based asylum claims. See Matter of R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec.
906, 927-28 (AG. 2001), vacating and remanding 22 I. & N. Dec. 906,927-28 (B.I.A. 1999).
Although DHS agreed to a grant of asylum, Republican Attorney General Ashcroft directed
the Board to continue waiting for regulations, which were never issued. Matter of R-A-, 23 1.
&N. Dec. 694 (AG. 2005). Republican Attorney General Mukasey eventually lifted that stay.
Matter ofR-A-, 24 L &N. Dec. 629,630-31 (AG. 2008). In 2014, the Board issued a precedent
decision in a different case, granting asylum based on domestic violence. Matter of A-R-C-G-,
26 L & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014), overruled by Matter ofA-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G.
2018). But Republican Attorney General Sessions overruled Matter ofA-R-C-G- in 2018,
stating that asylum cases based on domestic violence are unlikely to succeed. A-B-, 27 1. & N.
Dec. at 319-20.
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less than one year, he used the review mechanism four times. 0 By
comparison, Attorney Generals under Clinton and Obama used their
review powers a total of seven times in eight years. 1 Furthermore,
while prior Attorney Generals relied primarily on referrals from the
Board, which is positioned to identify cases that raise important policy
issues, Sessions chose to self-certify--that is, hand pick-the cases he
wanted to decide.2 Even more remarkable, Sessions took on issues
that were never raised by the parties or addressed by the Board,
suggesting a manipulation of individual cases to achieve political
ends.

3

Most striking of all is Sessions's use of the review power to curtail
the procedural rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings, rather than
to make the types of policy choices that agency head review was
designed to preserve for a political appointee. In addition, his decisions
are replete with language that makes expeditious enforcement the
highest priority, above fair adjudication. Both of those issues are
discussed below.
B.

ProceduralRights Versus Policy Choices

The four cases that Attomey General Sessions decided during his
tenure scaled back the procedural rights of noncitizens in removal
proceedings, clearing the path to swift deportations. The Supreme
Court has distinguished between procedures that are necessary to "meet
the essential standard of fairness under the Due Process Clause" and
"choices of policy."2 4 While the Attorney General review mechanism
is best suited for policy choices, Sessions used it to curtail the
procedural rights of noncitizens in removal proceedings.
1.

Administrative Closure

Administrative closure is a procedure that involves removing a
case from an U's active docket. It does not result in a final order, and
either party may move to re-calendar the case at an appropriate time.
220. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 405 (A.G. 2018); A-B-, 27 1. & N. Dec.
316; Matter of Castro-Tun, 27 L & N. Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018); Matter of E-F-H-L-, 27 1. & N.
Dec. 226 (A.G. 2018).
221. Chase, supra note 208. Had he remained Attorney General, Sessions was also on
track to outpace George W. Bush's three Attorney Generals, who exercised review fifteen
times in eight years. Id
222. Id
223. See id
224. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 35 (1982).
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Two of the decisions that Sessions issued as Attorney General involved
administrative closure.
In Matter ofE-F-H-L-, Sessions self-certified a well-established
Board precedent without providing any explanation of why he chose
the case or what he hoped to accomplish.2" The Board had held that
asylum applicants are entitled to a full hearing on their applications,
The IJ had
consistent with prior Board and federal court precedents.
denied the respondent a full hearing after determining that his asylum
application did not establish a prima facie case." In reversing the IJ,
the Board relied on statutory and regulatory provisions addressing
procedural rights in removal proceedings."
On remand, the respondent withdrew his application for asylum
because he became eligible to legalize his status through a family-based
application, which provides a much more straightforward path to
permanent residence." Since the USCIS, not the immigration court,
has jurisdiction over family-based petitions, the parties filed a joint
motion to administratively close the removal proceedings, which
would allow the judge to take the case temporarily off the court's
docket to give USCIS time to make a decision.2 30 The IJ naturally
granted that joint motion."
At that point, Sessions stepped in, vacated the Board's four-yearold decision holding that asylum seekers have a right to a full hearing,
and ordered that the case be re-calendared with the immigration
court.232 Sessions. reasoned that the case became moot when the
respondent withdrew his asylum application. 23 3 He did not address any
of the statutory provisions, regulations, or precedents that the Board
had analyzed.23 4 Sessions's cryptic decision, less than one page in
length, makes little sense when viewed on its own. Administrative
225. See 27 I. & N. Dec. 226.
226. Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 319, 324 (B.I.A. 2014), vacated, 27 I. & N.
226 (A.G. 2018); see also Matter of Fefe, 20 L & N. Dec. 116, 118 (B.I.A. 1989) ("In the
ordinary course, however, we consider the full examination of an applicant to be an essential
aspect of the asylum adjudication process for reasons related to fairness to the parties and to
the integrity of the asylum process itself.").
227. E-F-H-L-, 26 L & N. Dec. at 320.
228. Id at 320-21, 324 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(bX4) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.1 1(cX3)
(2013)).
229. E-F-H-L-, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 226.
230. Id
231. Id
232. Id
233. Id
234. See id
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closure in this situation was standard practice, especially when
unopposed by DHS, and serves the interests of judicial efficiency.
When viewed together with subsequent decisions and policy
statements, however, it becomes clear that E-F-H-L- was the first step
in an effort to use the Attorney General review mechanism to curtail
noncitizens' procedural rights and speed up removal cases.
In May 2018, a couple months after issuing his decision in E-FH-L-, Sessions issued his decision in Castro-Tum, holding that Us and
the Board do not have general legal authority to administratively close
cases.2 35 The issue that Sessions addressed in Matter of Castro-Tun
was totally different than the issue that had been presented to the Board.
The Board considered whether DHS had met its burden of establishing
proper notice of the removal hearing.23 6 Finding that notice was
adequate, the Board vacated the I's administrative closure order and
remanded the case? Thus, there was no need for the agency head to
intervene.
Yet Sessions certified the case to himselfto decide a much broader
question: whether any U has the legal authority to administratively
close a case. In holding that Us do not have general authority to
administratively close a case, Sessions overruled prior Board
precedents and flew in the face of decades of agency practice.2 38
Sessions asserted that administrative closure is only justified if it is
based on a specific regulation or judicially approved settlement?
Castro-Tum attacked the practice of administrative closure as
"encumber[ing] the fair and efficient administration of immigration
cases" 24 and complained that DHS had used this practice under the
Obama Administration "as a way to decline to prosecute low priority
cases."24 1 Sessions explicitly stressed the need to "swiftly adjudicate
immigration cases" and issue deportation orders when the respondent
fails to appear. 242
Sessions did not mention the role that administrative closure plays
in safeguarding due process rights in immigration cases. For example,
235. 271. &N. Dec. 271,274,283 (A.G. 2018).
236. Id at 281.
237. Id at 274,281.
238. Id at 272,274 (overruling Matter ofAvetisyan, 25 L & N. Dec. 688 (BLA. 2012),
and Matter of W-Y-U-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 17 (B.IA. 2017), to the extent they conflict).
239. Id at 274.
240. Id at 273.
241. Id at 276.
242. Id at 290.
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the Board has indicated that administrative closure may be appropriate
to safeguard the due process rights of mentally incompetent
noncitizens.24 3 Nor did Sessions explain how his holding in CastroTum squares with Us' delegated authority to "exercise their
independent judgment and discretion in considering and determining
the cases coming before the Board ... [and how judges'] may take any
action ... appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case." 2
Courts have construed this regulatory language as empowering Us "to
take various actions for docket management," including administrative
closure.' In Matter ofAvetisyan, the Board reasoned that denying Us
the power to administratively close cases was an impermissible
violation of their delegated responsibility to adjudicate cases. 246 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concurred,
explaining that "administrative closure is a tool that an U or the BIA
must be able to use, in appropriate circumstances, as part of their
delegated authority, independence and discretion."

24 7

Not only did Castro-Tum undermine the delegated authority of Us
and make administrative closure much harder for noncitizens to obtain
by overruling Avetisyan, but it also included ominous language about
continuances. The decision described continuances as a "docketmanagement device" and warned Us that they remain accountable for
the delay.248 Attorney General Sessions subsequently addressed
continuances directly in Matter ofL-A-B-R-, discussed below.
2.

Continuances

Continuances in removal proceedings are critical to give
noncitizens time to find a representative, obtain corroborating
evidence, present relevant witness testimony, and receive a decision
from the USCIS on a pending visa petition that would create a path to
legal status. In July 2017, the Chief U explained that "the appropriate

243. Matter ofM-A-M-, 25 L & N. Dec. 474,483 (BIA 2011). Butsee Diop v. Lynch,
807 F.3d 70, 76-77 (4th Cir. 2015) (holding that the U's denials of a request for continuance
or administrative closure and request for a mental health evaluation did not deprive him of
procedural due process).
244. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii), 1003.10(b) (2018).
245. Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2018).
246. 251. & N. Dec. 688,693 (B.LA. 2012).
247. Gonzalez-Caraveo, 882 F.3d at 890.
248. Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 L & N. Dec. 271,288,293 (A.G. 2018).
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use of continuances serves to protect due process, which Immigration
Judges must safeguard above all."2 49
Under the regulations, "good cause" must be shown for a
continuance to be granted.2 50 In 2009, the Board identified five
nonexclusive factors for Us to use in evaluating whether good cause
exists to grant a continuance when there is a collateral application with
a different agency such as a pending visa petition with the USCIS.2 1
Federal courts have consistently applied these factors and found error
in cases where all of the factors were not properly considered.2 52
In L-A-B-R-, Sessions decided to review "issues relating to when
there is 'good cause' to grant a continuance for a collateral matter to be
adjudicated."2 53 After self-certifying the case, Sessions issued a notice
directing the Board to refer him other cases raising this issue. All of
the decisions referred to him involved situations where the Board had
declined to hear an interlocutory appeal by DHS that challenged an U's

249. See Memorandum from MaryBeth Keller, Chief Immigration Judge, Exec. Office
for Immigration Rev., to All Immigration Judges, Court Administrators, Attorney Advisors,
Judicial Law Clerks, and Court Staft Regarding Operating Policies and Procedures 3 (July 31,
2017), https//www.justice.gov/eoir/fleloppml7-01/download.
250. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 (2018) ("The Immigration Judge may grant a motion for
continuance for good cause shown."); id § 1240.6 ("After the commencement of the hearing,
the immigration judge may grant a reasonable adjournment either at his or her own instance
or, for good cause shown, upon application by the respondent or the [DHS].'); see also Matter
of M-, 5 I. & N. Dec. 622, 624 (BJ.A. 1954) ("[Tihe special inquiry officer may at the
commencement of the hearing, grant a reasonable adjournment for good cause shown.").
251. Matter of Hashmi, 24 1. & N. Dec. 785, 790 (BJ.A. 2009). These factors are:
(1) the DHS response to the motion [to continue]; (2) whether the underlying visa
petition is prima facie approvable; (3) the respondent's statutory eligibility for
adjustment of status; (4) whether the respondent's application for adjustment merits
a favorable exercise of discretion; and (5) the reason for the continuance and other
procedural factors.
Id The decision further states that the judge "may also consider any other facts that he deems
appropriate." Id at 794; see also Matter of Sanchez Sosa, 25 I. & N. Dec. 807, 815 (B.IA.
2012) ("As a general rule, there is a rebuttable presumption that an alien who has filed a prima
facie approvable application [for a U visa] with the USCIS will warrant a favorable exercise
of discretion for a continuance for a reasonable period of time.").
252. See, e.g., Marube v. Sessions, 712 F. App'x 246, 247-48 (4th Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (finding that the Board abused its discretion in failing to consider all of the Hashmi
factors); Ferreira v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240, 1242-43 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that the
Board "failed to apply its own precedent when it denied [the petitioner's] motion for a
continuance" based only on the length of time before a visa would become available).
253. Matter of L-A-B-R- (L-A-B-R- Certfication), 27 I. & N. Dec. 245, 245 (A.G.
2018).
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decision to grant a continuance, consistent with the Board's practice
disfavoring interlocutory review.25
Attorney General Sessions's decision in L-A-B-R-, issued in
August 2018, confirms the "good cause" standard and the same
multifactor test that the Board adopted in Matter of Hashmi for
evaluating a continuance request based on a collateral application.25 5
Like Hashmi, L-A-B-R- also states that the U must primarilyconsider
"the likelihood that the collateral relief will be granted and will
materially affect the outcome of the removal proceedings."2 56
However, L-A-B-R- goes on to instruct Us about how they should
exercise their discretion by identifying situations where good cause
"may not" or "does not" exist.
L-A-B-R- states that good cause "may not exist when the alien has
not demonstrated reasonable diligence in pursuing the collateral
adjudication, DHS justifiably opposes the motion, or the requested
continuance is unreasonably long, among other possibilities."2 The
decision further states that good cause "does not exist if the alien's visa
priority date is too remote." 258 This assertion will likely lead to the
denial of continuances for many categories of noncitizens, such as
those waiting for a family-based visa to become available, including
spouses of permanent residents, as well as unaccompanied minors
waiting for the USCIS to make a Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
determination and victims of crimes with pending U-visa applications.
Perhaps the most notable aspect of L-A-B-R- is its description of
continuances as a "case-management tool," rather than a safeguard for
due process. 259 L-A-B-R- directs Us to consider "administrative
efficiency" in deciding whether to grant a continuance, asserting that,
"at bottom, continuances are themselves intendedto pmmote efficient
case management."2 ' Sessions faulted the Board for stating inHashmi
254. See Matter of L-A-B-R-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 405,411 (A.G. 2018); Matter of M-D-,
24 1. & N. Dec. 138, 139 (B.I.A. 2007) (explaining that interlocutory review is disfavored).
255. L-A-B-R-, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 412-15,418.
256. Id at 412; see also Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 790 ("Although the focus of the
inquiry is the likelihood that the adjustment application will be granted, we find that there are
a number of factors that may be relevant to evaluate and weigh in deciding whether a
continuance is warranted in family-based adjustment scenarios."); Matter of Rajah, 25 1. & N.
Dec. 127, 136 (B.I.A. 2009) ("As discussed in Matter ofHashmi, the focus of the inquiry is
the likelihood of success on the adjustment application.").
257. 27 I. & N. Dec. at 412 (emphasis added).
258. Id at418 (emphasis added).
259. Id at 406.
260. Id at 416 (emphasis added).
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that "[c]ompliance with an Immigration Judge's case completion
goals ... is not a proper factor in deciding a continuance request. 261
Under L-A-B-R-, case completion and expeditiousness become
important considerations.2 62 Indeed, L-A-B-R- repeatedly suggests that
continuances are being abused by immigrants as a "dilatory tactic" and
"an illegitimate form of de facto relief from removal."2 3
This focus on administrative efficiency in ruling on requests for
continuances increases the risk of due process violations. In Ungarv.
Sarafite, the Supreme Court cautioned against "a myopic insistence
upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.'"
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has observed that "an immigrant's right
to have her case heard should not be sacrificed because of the I's heavy
caseload."' Yet L-A-B-R- never mentions due process as a relevant
concern in ruling on continuances. 2 6 Nor does any part of the
multifactor test for granting a continuance take into account the extent
of harm suffered by the respondent as a result of a denial of a
continuance, which federal courts often consider in determining
whether the denial of a continuance violates due process in the criminal
context." Additionally, multiple circuits have expressed concerns

261. Id (alteration in original) (quoting Hashmi, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 793-94).
262. Id (citing Hashmi v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 531 F.3d 256,261 (3d Cir. 2008)).
263. Idat4O7,411.
264. 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964); see also Romero-Morales v. INS, 25 F.3d 125, 130-31
(2d Cir. 1994) (applying Ungar in the immigration context); Rios-Berrios v. INS, 776 F.2d
859, 862-63 (9th Cir. 1985) (same).
265. Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 2008).
266. See L-A-B-R-, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 408.
267. See, e.g., United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying
a four-part test for determining whether the denial of a continuance violated due process, which
requires considering (1) "the extent of appellant's diligence in his efforts to ready his defense
prior to the date set for hearing" (2) "how likely it is that the need for a continuance could have
been met if the continuance had been granted,"(3) "the extent to which granting the
continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing party, including its
witnesses," and (4) "the extent to which the appellant might have suffered harm as a result of
the district court's denial"); see also United States v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130, 113843 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the denial for a continuance deprived the defendant of due
process under this four-part test); United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281, 1286 (5th Cir. 1976)
(setting forth highly relevant factors in assessing the denial of continuances, including "the
likelihood of prejudice from denial"). Some courts have also adopted multifactor tests for
assessing whether the denial of a continuance violates a defendant's right to present witness
testimony. These tests include the degree to which the testimony is favorable to the accused.
See Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 1986); Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d
1146,1149 (5th Cir. 1981).
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about blaming a noncitizen in removal proceedings for the USCIS's
delay in processing a visa application.268
Although a due process violation based on the denial of a
continuance is difficult to establish, courts have found due process
violations in certain circumstances. For example, courts have found
due process violations where the denial of a continuance deprived the
noncitizen of the right to counsel,2 denied the noncitizen an
opportunity to investigate a forensic report submitted by the
government, 270 limited testimony,271 prevented submitting fngerprints
for background checks 2 and deprived the noncitizen of an
opportunity to have a collateral application adjudicated by the
USCIS. 2 73 Sessions's decision in L-A-B-R threatens to undermine these
procedural rights.
Even before L-A-B-R-, wide variation existed among Us in their
willingness to grant continuances and the length of the continuances
they granted.274 An empirical study of continuances by David
268. Ahmed v. Holder, 569 F.3d 1009, 1012-14 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the denial
of a continuance for the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) to adjudicate the appeal of a
denial of an employment-based visa petition violated due process and noting that "[i]f anyone
is to be blamed for the delay in this case, it is the AAO, not Ahmed"); Rajah v. Mukasey, 544
F.3d 449, 456 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing denial of continuance and remanding to the Board for
further guidance on what constitutes "sufficient time" in light of the "delays endemic in almost
every stage of acquiring any visa"); Subhan v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 591, 593-95 (7th Cir. 2004)
(concluding that the U abused his discretion in denying petitioner a third requested continuance
solely because the Department of Labor had not yet acted on the petitioner's application, and
holding that the U must provide a reason consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) when denying such
a continuance).
269. See Biwot v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1094,1098-1101(9th Cir. 2005); Rios-Berrios v.
INS, 776 F.2d 859, 862-64 (9th Cir. 1985); Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1300
(7th Cir. 1975); see also Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1327 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that
denial of a continuance in a criminal case that resulted in the defendant being unrepresented by
the attorney familiar with his case violated due process).
270. Bondarenko v. Holder, 733 F.3d 899,906-07(9th Cir. 2013).
271. Cruz Rendon v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding a violation
of due process where the petitioner was denied a continuance and limitations were placed on
her testimony); see also Manlove v. Tansy, 981 F.2d 473, 476-79 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the denial of defendant's request for a continuance to obtain witness violated due process
in a rape prosecution); Hicks, 633 F.2d at 1140-50 (holding that the denial of a continuance
violated due process when it prevented petitioner from presenting his only expert witness on
his insanity defense, which was the sole issue at trial).
272. Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1292-95 (9th Cir. 2008).
273. Ahme4 569 F.3d at 1013-14.
274. See David Hausman & Jayashri Srikantiah,
lne, Due Process, and
Representation:An Empiricaland LegalAnalysis of Continuances in Immigration Court, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 1823, 1827-28 (2016) (arguing that courts should consider the effect of
continuance length on access to counsel in deciding how much time is constitutionally
adequate).
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Hausman and Jayashri Srikantiah found that some judges "tend to give
several continuances with six months or more between hearings; others
give only one or two continuances with only a month or two between
hearings."2 7 ' They found that moving from a one-month to a twomonth continuance nearly doubled the chance of an unrepresented
child finding a lawyer.2 76 Because Us know that more time increases
the chance of finding a lawyer and successfully applying for relief
"[t]he same Us who are more likely to. order immigrants deported also
grant shorter and fewer continuances."2 " Sessions likewise understood
that because he heightened the standard for granting a continuance in
L-A-B-R- and stressed the importance of expedience, Us are now likely
to grant fewer and shorter continuances, resulting in swifter
deportations.
3.

Summary Dismissals

The last decision by Sessions discussed here, Matter ofA-B-, has
contributed to the summary dismissal of asylum claims by some Us
without any evidentiary hearing.2" 8 It has done so in conjunction with
a BIA case decided in 2018 called Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-,2 79
which A-B- cites approvingly.28 0
In order to understand how this has happened, a little more
background in the particular social group (PSG) ground for asylum is
necessary. "[Miembership in a particular social group" is one of five
protected grounds for asylum, along with race, religion, nationality, and
political opinion.28 1 In fact, it is the most convoluted and controversial
ground, as its definition is complicated and has changed over time.2 8
In Matter of A-R-C-G-, which A-B- overruled, the Board had
recognized a PSG defined as 'married women in Guatemala who are
275. Id at 1827.
276. See id at 1830.
277. Id at 1834.
278. 27 1. & N. Dec. 316, 317 (A.G. 2018).
279. 27 1. & N. Dec. 189 (B.I.A. 2018).
280. See 27 1. & N. Dec. at 344.
281. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2XA) (2012).
282. In 2014, the Board clarified that the three requirements for establishing a social
group are (1) an immutable characteristic, meaning something the asylum seeker cannot
change or should not have to change because it is fundamental to identity; (2) particularity,
meaning that the boundaries of the group are so clear that one can determine who is inside and
outside of the group; and 3) social distinction, meaning that society in general in the applicant's
home country perceives the proposed group as distinct from the rest of society. See Matter of
M-E-V-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 227, 231-33 (B.I.A. 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 L & N. Dec.
208, 209-17 (B.I.A. 2014).
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unable to leave their relationships" in granting asylum to a woman
whose persecution involved extreme domestic violence by her
husband. 283 Accordingly, the respondent in A-B- defined her PSG
along the same lines as 'El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave
their domestic relationship where they have children in common' with
their partners."" The U rejected that social group, but the Board found
it cognizable and remanded the case with an order to grant asylum upon
the completion of background checks.285 Instead of granting asylum,
however, the U tried to recertify the case to the Board for further
consideration in light of intervening legal developments leading the U
to believe that the precedents the Board had relied on were no longer
valid.2 86 Before the Board could respond, Attorney General Sessions
stepped in and certified the case to himself.
He requested briefing on "whether, and under what
circumstances, being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a
cognizable 'particular social group' for purposes of an application for
asylum or withholding of removal," even though the respondent in AB- had never defined her PSG as a "victim of private criminal
Both parties asked the Attorney General to clarify the
activity."
question on which briefing was requested, but he declined to do so. 2 8 8
Furthermore, while the case was pending before him, Sessions publicly
stated that he thought domestic violence is an "obviously false" basis
for asylum.28 The day he issued the decision, he told an audience of
Us that "the vast majority of the current asylum claims are not valid." 29
The decision itself called into question entire categories of asylum
claims, stating, "Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic
violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will

283. 26 1. & N. Dec. 388,338-39 (B.IA. 2014), overruledby A-B-, 27 1. & N. Dec. 316.
284. A-B-, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 321 (quoting Decision Denying Asylum Application at
*8).
285. Id at 321.
286. Id at 321-22.
287. Id at 317.
288. Backgrounderand Briefing on Matter of A-B-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE
STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/matter-b/backgrounder-and-briefmg-matter-b (last updated
Aug. 2018).
289. A-B-, 27 1. & N. Dec. at 320; JeffSessions Wants to Close 'BlatantLoopholes' in
Immigration Law, KTAR NEWS (May 7, 2018), https//ktar.com/story/2054280/ag-jeffsessions-says-closing-loopholes-can-fight-illegal-immigration/.
290. Att'y Gen. Jeff Sessions, Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
Legal Training Program (June 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneml-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review-legal.

754

TULANE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 93:707

not qualify for asylum."29 1 Sessions stressed that "if an alien's asylum
application is fatally flawed in one respect-for example, for failure to
show membership in a proposed social group-an immigration judge
or the Board need not examine the remaining elements of the asylum
claim."m A-B- cited with approval the Board's 2018 decision in W-YC- & H-O-B-, which requires asylum applicants to provide an "exact
delineation" of their proposed PSG to the U and prohibits revising the
social group at the administrative level.2 93 In effect, these rules impose
an exceedingly high standard not applied to any area of law, or even to
any other type of asylum claim, also paving the way for summary
dismissals.
A-B- did not stop there. It also applied a heightened standard for
persecution in cases involving nongovernmental actors, requiring the
asylum seeker to demonstrate that "the government condoned the
private actions 'or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to
2 9 In contrast, the well-established standard for
protect the victims."'m
non-state actors simply requires showing that the government is
"unable or unwilling" to control a nongovernmental persecutor.2 95

Soon after A-B- was decided, the USCIS issued new guidance to
all of its asylum officers, advising them about the impact of A-B- on
credible fear interviews and asylum interviews. 296 This guidance
repeats the generalization in A-B- that claims based on domestic
violence and gang violence are unlikely to succeed, adopts the
heightened standard for persecution by non-state actors, and includes
the requirement set forth in W-Y-C- & H-O-B- that asylum seekers
provide an exact delineation of their proposed PSG.29 7
291. A-B-, 271. & N. Dec. at 320.
292. Id at 340 (citation omitted).
293. Id at 344 (citing 271. & N. Dec. 189, 190-91 (B.I.A. 2018)).
294. Id at 337 (emphasis added) (quoting Galina v. INS, 213 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir.
2000)).
295. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.IA. 1985). This standard stems
from the INA, which describes a refugee, in relevant part, as someone who is "unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of [his or her home country]." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(aX42)(A) (2012).
296. U.S. CrZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PM602-0162, PoucY MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE
FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN AcCORDANCE WITH MATTER OFA-B- (2018), https//

www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162USCIS-Memorandum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf.
297. Id at 6 ("In general, ... claims based on membership in a putative particular social
group defmed by the members' vulnerability to harm of domestic violence or gang violence
committed by non-government actors will not establish the basis for ... a credible ... fear of
persecution."); id at 10 ("[T]he home government must either condone the behavior or
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Perhaps most striking of all, the USCIS guidance went beyond AB- and instructed asylum officers to ignore any federal appeals
decisions that conflict with A-B-.29 8 Prior guidance never instructed
asylum officers to disregard federal appellate court decisions. In fact,
prior guidance encouraged asylum officers to consider the law in all
circuits at the credible fear stage, explaining that "generally the
interpretation most favorable to the applicant is used when determining
whether the applicant meets the credible fear standard.'2
The new USCIS guidance is also remarkable for its lack of
transparency.300 The traditional practice is for USCIS's Asylum
Division to draft guidance and submit it for approval by the Chief of
the Asylum Division. However, the guidance was "issued outside
those channels, without approval from any of the DHS's Asylum
Division experts."30 ' The USCIS guidance on A-B- has no "from"
field, no named author, and no signature, providing no indication of
who is responsible for the document and making no one accountable.o2
Despite its questionable origins, the new USCIS guidance immediately
resulted in more negative credible fear determinations and therefore
more expedited removals. 303
In Grace v. Whitaker, however, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia abrogated A-B- and found that provisions
of the USCIS guidance implementing or even going beyond A-B- were
unlawful. 30 Applying the Chevron test to Sessions's interpretation of
"particular social group," the court concluded that a near-blanket rule
precluding domestic violence claims at the credible fear stage is an

demonstrate a complete helplessness to protect victims of such alleged persecution."); id at 3
("[A]n applicant seeking asylum or refugee status based on membership in a particular social
group must present facts that clearly identify the proposed particular social group.').
298. Id at 8-9 (stating that asylum officers should "apply the case law of the relevant
federal circuit court, to the extent that those cases are not inconsistent with Matter ofA-B-").
299. See 2017 Lesson Plan on Credible Fear, supra note 188, at 17.
300. Cf Mashaw & Berke, supra note 114, at 612-13 ("Presidentialism that takes
account of process and participatory values; is transparent and robust concerning sources,
science, and data consulted or relied upon ... is, from our perspective, good government.
Failure to abide by these conventions, while sometimes justified, is generally problematic and
anti-democratic." (footnote omitted)).
301. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 19 n.1, Grace v. Sessions, No.
1:18-cv-01853 (D.D.C. Aug. 7,2018).
302. Id
303. See Tal Kopan, Trump Adninistrationto Turn Away FarMore Asylum Seekers at

the Border Under New Guidance, CNN (July 12, 2018), https://www.cn.com/2018/07/1 1/
politics/border-immigrants-asylum-restrictions/index.html.
304. 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 105 (D.D.C. 2018).
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unreasonable interpretation of the statute under step two of Chevron.30
The court reasoned that the general rule announced by Sessions runs
contrary to the individualized analysis required by the INA, conflicts
with Congress's intent to align U.S. asylum law with the Refugee
Protocol, and heightens the standard at the credible fear stage.3 6 The
court further found that the "condoned or complete helplessness"
standard set forth in A-B- and the USCIS guidance impermissibly
heightened the legal standard for persecution by nongovernmental
actors. 307
While Grace has helped prevent the denial of credible fear for
entire classes of asylum claims, it does not directly affect how Us
approach domestic violence and gang-related cases in removal
proceedings. Since Sessions vacated E-F-H-L-, which had protected
the right to a full evidentiary hearing in removal proceedings,0 some
Us feel empowered to summarily dismiss cases without an evidentiary
hearing based on the purported failure to establish a cognizable PSG
early in the proceedings. 3 " Failure to demonstrate the existence of a
PSG with sufficient documentation can lead to the swift denial of
asylum, even without the presentation of testimony. As former
Immigration Judge Jeffrey Chase has pointed out, "The judges that
conclude ... [that] the best practice is to summarily deny asylum
without testimony are exactly the type of judge the present
administration wants on the bench.""o Yet prior decisions by the Board
and circuit courts recognize how difficult it is for an asylum seeker to
satisfy the burden of proof without providing testimony' and how
relevant facts often continue to develop up until the final hearing.3 12
The use of summary dismissals ignored this reality.
305. Id at 125-26.
306. Id at 126-27.
307. Id at 127-30.
308. 26I. & N. Dec. 319,321 (B.I.A. 2014), vacated 27 . &N. 226 (A.G. 2018).
309. Orders issued by an IJ in Dallas, for example, gave an asylum seeker thirty days to
submit written documentation establishing the PSG, citing cases and legal standards pertaining
to motions for summary judgment, which do not exist in imnigration court See Order to
Produce in an Asylum or Withholding Case, Immigration Judge Pre-Hearing Order (Robert
W. Kimball), Dallas, Tex., May 29,2018 (on file with author).
310. Jeffriey S. Chase, Are Summary Denials Coming to Immigration Court?, OPINIONs/
ANALYSIS ON IMMIGR. L. (June 24,2018), https//www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/6/24/aresummary-denials-cming-to-inmigration-court.
311. See, e.g., Matter of Fefe, 20 I.& N. Dec. 116, 118 (BI.A. 1989).
312. See, e.g., Hoxha v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 210, 214, 217-18 (1st Cir. 2006);
Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679,688 (9th Cir. 2003); Matter of A-S-, 211. & N. Dec.
1106, 1110 (B.IA. 1998).
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By curtailing the use of administrative closure and continuances,
and encouraging summary dismissals, Sessions scaled back procedural
rights in removal proceedings and facilitated swift deportations.
C

Policy Making Versus Prosecution

The cases discussed above not only cross the line between lawbased determinations of procedural rights and policy choices, but also
cross the line between policy making and prosecution. In her article,
Presidential Administration, Elena Kagan set "the appropriate
boundaries on presidential direction' at "prosecutorial authority,"
arguing that "it is in this area, because so focused on particular
individuals and firms, that the crassest forms of politics (involving, at
the extreme, personal favors and vendettas) pose the greatest danger of
displacing professionalism and thereby undermining confidence in
legal decisionmaking."" The Trump Administration's interference in
immigration adjudication, especially former Attorney General
Sessions's decisions discussed above, risk undermining confidence in
legal decision making by pushing for expeditious immigration
enforcement.
Although case management and efficiency could, in theory, be
neutral concepts, Sessions deployed them in a purely one-sided manner
that consistently favored DHS over noncitizens. In L-A-B-R-, for
example, Sessions only collected cases where the Board had declined
to hear an interlocutory appeal by DHS of an I's decision grantinga
continuance.3 14 Although the decision purports to be concerned with
efficiency and case management in general, it focuses only on
continuances requested by the noncitizen. The decision provides no
guidance for what DHS would need to establish to satisfy the "good
cause" standard when it requests a continuance, even though the
regulation explicitly applies the "good cause" standard to both
parties.' 15

A more neutral approach to reducing delay would address both
parties, especially since DHS was responsible for 14% of the

313. Kagan, supra note 95, at 2357-58; see also Mashaw & Berke, supra note 114, at
606 ("Kagan expressed a hesitancy about presidentialism seeping into prosecution (as opposed
to regulatory policymaking), but Obama's white-collar enforcement ramp-up and Trump's
deportation guidance move precisely in that direction." (footnote omitted)).
314. See 271. & N. Dec. 405,418 (A.G. 2018).
315. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.6 (2018).

758

TULANE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 93:707

continuances granted between 2006 and 2015.316 In addition, DHSrelated continuances increased by 54% from 2006 to 2016, far more
than any other category of continuance, suggesting a growing need to
address this issue.'17 By comparison, continuances requested by
noncitizens increased by only 18%."'
The way that Sessions framed continuances as "reflect[ing] the
public interest in expeditious enforcement of the immigration laws"
also presents enforcement, rather than fair adjudication, as the primary
purpose of removal proceedings.'
The conclusion of L-A-B-Runderscores this perspective, warning that "[t]he absence of any
reasoned explanation for the grant of a continuance may ... leave the
Board no choice but to vacate the order granting the continuance if
evidence supporting good cause is not clear from the record."3 20 This
reasoning applies equally to the denialof a continuance, but that is not
mentioned. In fact, in Ahmed v. Holder, the Ninth Circuit used almost
the same language as Sessions in concluding that "[a]bsent an
explanation from the [U], we have no choice but to conclude that the
denial of the continuancewas arbitrary and unreasonable."32 1
Just as Sessions's approach to continuances in L-A-B-R- focused
on enforcement, so did his response to administrative closure. CastroTm overruled Avetsyan, a Board decision that recognized Us'
authority to administratively close cases as part of their general
authority to regulate their dockets. Prior to Avetisyan, an U could not
administratively close a case if either party opposed closure. 3 22 AS
circuit courts recognized, "[T]his had the effect of allowing the [DHS]
to unilaterally control and decide administrative closure.'" 3 By
overruling Avetisyan, Sessions put himself in the role of prosecutor,
akin to DHS in the pre-Avetisyan world, and unilaterally decided that
Us should not be allowed to administratively close cases.

316. U.S. Gov'T AccOuNTABIT OFFICE, GAO-17-438, IMMIGRATION COURTS:
AcTIoNs NEEDED To REDucE CASE BACKLOG AND ADDRESS LONG-STANDING MANAGEMENT
AND OPERAHONAL CHALLENGES 124 (2017), https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685022.pdf
317. Id; see also BENSON& WHEELER, sr4pranote 18, at 73 (2012) (reporting that 11%
of delays were because a DHS attorney was not ready to proceed and that 14% were because
DHS was missing a file).
318. U.S. Gov'T AccouwrABILIm OFFICE, supranote 316, at 124.
319. L-A-B-R-, 27 L & N. Dec. at 406 (emphasis added).
320. Id at 418-19.
321. 569 F3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
322. See Matter of Gutierrez-Lopez, 21 L & N. Dec. 479,480 (B.IA 1996).
323. Gonzalez-Caraveo v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 885, 890 (9th Cir. 2018).
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Easing the path to summary dismissals by vacating the Board's
decision in E-F-H-L- and declaring entire categories of claims to be
nonstarters under A-B- further reflects the use of review powers for
prosecutorial purposes. This prosecutorial approach is consistent with
remarks Sessions made stating that the asylum system "is currently
subject to rampant abuse and fraud," causing the system to be
"overloaded with fake claims."'
Indeed, transforming adjudication into enforcement reflects the
Trump Administration's view of immigrants as criminals. Trump has
repeatedly described immigrants, particularly those from Mexico and
Central America, as criminals, drug dealers, rapists, murderers, gang
members, fraudsters, and animals who "prey on our citizens."32 5 One
of his first executive orders on immigration created an Office for
Victims of Immigrant Crimes.326 In June 2018, Trump tweeted about
"bad" immigrants "infest[ing] our Country, like MS-13."3 27 A month
prior, Trump had claimed "[t]hese [immigrants] aren't people-these
are animals."" Characterizing immigrants as criminals eased the way
for the Trump Administration to cross the line from permissible policy
making to impermissible prosecution.

324. Att'y Gen. Jeff Sessions, supranote 30; see also Backlog ofPending Cases in
Immigration Courts as of November 2018, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDs ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE, htp*//trac.syr.edupbptools/immigraon/court backlog/apprepbackog.php
(last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (showing the sharp increase in pending cases in immigration court
from FY1998 to FY2019); Jeffrey S. Chase, In Response to the A.G. 's Claims Regarding
Asylum Fr-audOPINIONs/ANALYSIS ONIl@mGR. L. (Oct. 26,2017), https-//www.jeffreyschase.
con/blog/2017/10/26/in-response-sessions-claims-regarding-asyhm-faud ("In support of his
fraud claim, Sessions stated that many who were found to have a credible fear of persecution
and paroled into the U.S. did not subsequently apply for asylum. However, he neglected to
mention that many of those parolees are unaccompanied children.").
325. Philip Bump, Here's Everything Donald Thmp SaidAbout Immigration in His
Speech to Congress, WASH. PosT (Mar. 1, 2017), https/www.washingtonpost.com/news/
politics/wp/2017/03/01/heres-everything-donald-trump-said-about-immigration-in-his-speechto-congress.
326. As journalist Peter Beinart noted, Trump's decision to publicize reports of crimes
by immigrants is similar to actions taken by Germany's Ministry of Justice in the 1930s to
publish reports of crimes by Jews. Peter Beinart, Thomp Scapegoats UnauthorizedImmigrants
for Crime, ATLAinc (Mar. 1, 2017), https/A/www.theatlantic.com/politics/archivet2Ol7/03/
trump-scapegoats-unauthorized-immigrants-for-crime/518238.
327. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwrrrER (June 19,2018, 8:52 AM EST),
https/twitter.com/realdonaldtrupfstatus/1009071403918864385.
328. Vann R. Newkirk IL, The Real Risk of Thanp's DehumanizationofImmigrants,
ATLANTIC (May 19, 2018), https*//www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/05/the-realrisk-of-trms-dehumanization-of-immigrants/560762/.
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ExEcuTIvE POLICIES THAT PREVENT ADJUDICATION

The final category of executive actions discussed in this Article
pertains to policies designed to prevent Us and asylum officers from
getting cases in the first place. These policies stop or deter noncitizens
from applying for asylum. While this category is the most attenuated
of the three forms of executive interference addressed in the Article, it
has the potential to subvert the U.S. asylum system. This Part discusses
three tactics that have been used by the Trump Administration to
prevent asylum adjudication: denying noncitizens the right to apply for
asylum at ports of entry, criminally prosecuting asylum seekers who
enter illegally, and separating parents from their children.
By preventing asylum claims from being filed, these executive
policies circumvent the statutory right to apply for asylum that
Congress created to codify the United States' international
obligations.329 The INA explicitly states that "[any alien who is
physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States (whether or not at a designatedport ofarrival...), irrespective
ofsuch alien'sstatus, may apply for asylum.""3 o This language stresses
that any individual may apply for asylum. Additionally, by specifically
addressing noncitizens who are "physically present" in the United
States or those who "arrive," the statute sets out distinct categories of
eligibility and protects both."' Unlike someone who is "physically
present," someone who "arrives" reaches the border but does not need
to set foot inside the country.332
In describing the procedures that officers must follow in dealing
with asylum seekers, the statute similarly uses mandatory language and
explicitly addresses both "arriving" noncitizens and those physically
present in the United States.3 The regulations likewise use mandatory
329. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat 102.
330. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
331. See Brief of Immigration Law Professors as Amici Curiaein Support of Plaintiffs'
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Partially Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 710, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (filed Feb. 21, 2019)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief of Immigration Law Professors], https://ccrustice.org/sites/default/
files/attach/2019/02/Amicus%2Brie/20of%20Inmmigration%2oLaw%20Scholars%20221.
pdf (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(aXl)).
332. See id at 9.
333. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (defining an applicant as a noncitizen "who arrives in
the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival ...)" (emphasis added)); id
§ 1225(aX3) ("All aliens . .. who are applicantsfor adnissionor otherwiseseeking adnission
.. . shall be inspectedbyimmigration officers." (emphasis added)); id § 1225(b)(1XA)(ii) ("If
an immigration officer determines that an alien ... who is arrivingin the United States ... is
inadmissible ... and the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under section
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language and interpret an "arriving alien' to mean someone "coming
or attempting to come into the United States," thereby including those
who have not yet crossed the border.33 The plain language of the INA
and its implementing regulations therefore provide a strong basis for
challenging the legality of policies and practices that seek to deter
people from applying for asylum. Since enacting the INA, Congress
has confirmed its intent to make the asylum process available to
everyone by repeatedly rejecting bills that sought to limit the number
of asylum applications."'
Not only is access to the asylum process mandatory, but so is
access to related forms of nondiscretionary relief, namely withholding
of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, both
of which reflect the international obligation of non-refoulement.' The
1158 of this title or a fear of persecution, the officer shallrefer the alien for an interview by the
asylum officer ... ." (emphasis added)); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2411
(2018) (noting that the President may not "override particular provisions of the INA"); East
Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1250 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Where 'Congress
itself has significantly limited executive discretion by establishing a detailed scheme that the
Executive must follow in [dealing with] aliens,' the Attorney General may not abandon that
scheme because he thinks it is not woricing well . . . ."(alteration in original) (quoting Jama v.
ICE, 543 U.S. 335, 368 (2005))).
334. 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2018); see also id § 235.3(b)(1)(i), (bX4) (describing the asylum
application procedure for an "arriving alien" and mandating that immigration officers "shall
notproceedfurtherwith removal of the alien until the alien has been referred for an interview
by an asylum officer" (emphasis added)).
335. For example, the Asylum Abuse Reduction Act would have prohibited migrants
from applying for asylum at the border, requiring prospective applicants to instead travel to a
U.S. embassy or consulate for an interview with an asylum officer, but the bill died in
committee. S. 3372, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). Other bills restricting the asylum procedure
introduced in the House of Representatives were also unsuccessful. See, e.g., Border Security
and Immigration Reform Act of2018, H.R. 6136, 115th Cong., tit. IV, §§ 4101, 4108 (2018);
Securing America's Future Act of2018, H.R. 4760, 115th Cong., tit. IV, §§ 4402,4408 (2018);
Asylum Reform and Border Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 391, 115th Cong. § 4 (2017).
336. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(bX3) (prohibiting removal to a country where the individual's life
or freedom is threatened); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-.18 (implementing withholding of removal
protection pursuant to the Convention Against Torture). Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee
Convention prohibits a state from returning "a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Refugee
Convention, supra note 45; see also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 3, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 ("No
State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.");
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 13, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 ("An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present Covenant may
be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and
shall, except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to
submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented
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norm of non-refoulement is well-established and has reached the status
of jus cogens in international law, meaning it is not subject to
derogation.337
Executive policies that prevent noncitizens from applying for
asylum may also run afoul of constitutional due process. When
Congress grants a statutory right to apply for asylum and instructs an
agency to establish procedures to effectuate that right, procedural due
process requires that the procedures be fair and are followed. 3 Even
noncitizens who are technically outside of the United States (for
example, waiting to apply for asylum at a port of entry) have certain
constitutional rights. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court found
that "questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and
While a full discussion of
practical concerns, not formalism." 3
extraterritoriality is beyond the scope of this Article, suffice it to say
that noncitizen asylum seekers who are mere steps from the border and
stopped from entering by CBP have a strong claim that the right to due
process reaches them.'
The executive branch is bound to uphold the Constitution and
implement the laws enacted by Congress, including laws pertaining to
asylum. As the Supreme Court explained in Youngstown, "the
President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes
for the purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by
the competent authority.").
337. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Exec. Comm., General Conclusion on
International Protection, para. (i), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/878 (Oct. 11, 1996) (concluding that the
norm of non-refoulement is "not subject to derogation").
338. See Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The basic procedural
rights Congress intended to provide asylum applicants ... are particularly important because
an applicant erroneously denied asylum could be subject to death or persecution if forced to
return to his or her home country.").
339. 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008); see also Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d
983, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) ('The Supreme Court has held in a series of cases that the border of
the United States is not a clear line that separate aliens who may bring constitutional challenges
from those who may not"). The Ninth Circuit has examined three factors in determining the
Constitution's extraterritorial application: (1) the citizenship and status of the claimant, (2) the
nature of the location where the constitutional violation occurred, and (3) the practical
obstacles inherent in enforcing the claimed right. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719,
729 (9th Cir. 2018) (addressing a Fouth Amendment claim).
340. For a more detailed discussion of extraterritoriality in the context of litigation
challenging the alleged policy and practice of turning back asylum seekers at port of entry, see
Amicus Brief of Immigration Law Professors, supranote 331, at 12-16. See also Eva L. Bitran,
Note, Boumediene at the Border? The ConstitutionandForeignNationalson the US.-Mexico
Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 229, 244-47 (2014) ("[Tlhe United States' authority over a
region need not be as strong as it was in Bownediene for rights to adhere, particularly where
the degree of interdependence between two countries is so high.").
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the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."' The executive does not have
the "power to revise clear statutory terms," even if they "turn out not to
work in practice."3 42 Nor may the executive "decline to follow a
statutory mandate or prohibition simply because of policy
objections."3 43 Yet the executive actions discussed below indicate a
concerted effort to do just that.
These actions also undermine the United States' international
obligations. In an authoritative advisory opinion, the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) ruled that denying admission
to asylum seekers at the border violates the principle of nonrefoulement, which encompasses the right to "fair and efficient asylum
procedures."" The advisory opinion stresses that a state must not only
prevent asylum seekers' return to danger but must also "adopt a course
that does not result in their removal, directly or indirectly, to a place
where their lives or freedom would be in danger."'
A.

Denying the Right to Apply for Asylum

Over one hundred documented cases exist of CBP officers turning
away asylum seekers at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border."'

.

341. 343 U.S. 579,587 (1952).
342. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427,2446 (2014).
343. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1232 (9th Cir. 2018)
(quoting In re Aiken Cty., 725 F3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
344. U.N. High Comnn'r for Refugees, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial
Application of Non-Refouzement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, paras. 7-8 (Jan. 26, 2007), https://www.unhcr.org/
4d9486929.pdf.
345. Id para. 8 (emphasis added); see also Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 173
(De Albuquerque, J., concurring) ("The prohibition of refoulement is not limited to the territory
of a State, but also applies to extraterritorial State action .
346. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER AGENTS ILLEGALLY
REJEcr ASYLUM SEEKERs 1 (2017), https*//www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/hrfcrossing-the-line-report.pdf ("This report is based on 125 cases of individuals and families
wrongfully denied access to U.S. asylum procedures at U.S. ports of entry."); see also Moore,
supra note 102 ("[Tjhree migrants-a badly sunburned woman, her baby, and a 16-year-old
girl .... were stopped by two CBP agents, asked for documents, and told they would not be
allowed to go further into the United States because ofcapacity issues."); Robert Moore, At the
US. Border, Asylum Seekers Fleeing Violence Are Told to Come Back Later, WASH. POST
(June 13, 2018), https//www.washingtonpostcom/world/national-securityat-the-us-borderasyhum-seekers-fleeing-violence-are-told-to-come-back-later/2018/06/12779al2718-6e4d- 1
e8-afd5-778aca9O3bbe story.html ("Serbando Pineda Hemandez and his 15-year-old son,
Riquelmer, were making their ninth attempt in as many days to reach the port of entry here and
apply for asylum. ... But their path was blocked by two officers who told them that the port
of entry was at capacity and couldn't handle asylum applicants."); Debbie Nathan, Desperate
Asylum-Seekers Are Being TurnedAway by U.S. BorderAgents ClaimingThere's 'No Room,'
INTERCEPT (June 16, 2018), https//theinterceptcom/2018/06/16/immigration-border-asylum-
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CBP officers have prevented people from applying for asylum through
misrepresentations, threats and intimidation, verbal and physical abuse,
and coercion. Among other things, CBP officers have told asylum
seekers that President Trump signed a new law that ended asylum in
the United States, that the United States no longer offers asylum, and
that Mexicans are not eligible for asylum.' In some cases, CBP
officers threatened to take away the asylum seekers' children, call
Mexican immigration authorities, or let loose their dogs if the asylum
seekers did not leave the port of entry.3 8 CBP officers also physically
blocked asylum seekers from entering their office, held a gun to at least
one individual's back to make her leave, and physically assaulted
others to force them out.3 4 9

The most common allegation is that CBP officers are claiming
they are "at capacity" and cannot handle any more asylum
applicants. 50 DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen explained in an
interview, "We're 'metering,' which means that if we don't have the
resources to let them in on a particular day, they are going to have to
come back."" Similarly, CBP Commissioner Kevin McAleenan
stated that asylum seekers arriving at a port of entry "may need to wait
in Mexico as CBP officers work to process those already within our
facilities." 352

central-america/ ("A few times a day, the immigrants walk to the middle of the bridges and ask
to be admitted to the port of entry building on the U.S. side so that they can request asylum.
They are almost always turned back."); Jeremy Raf Watch the US. Turn Away Asylum
Seekers at the Border, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/video/mdex/
563084/us-border-asyhm/ ("Repeatedly turned away by U.S. border guards, the Berduo
family spent days sleeping on the ground next to the international bridge-trapped in a kind of
purgatory that spans the Rio Grande."); Dianne Solis & Alfredo Corchado, Asylum Seekers
ReportedlyDeniedEntryat Borderas Trump 77ghtens 'Zero Tolerance'ImmigrationPolicies,
DALL. NEWs (June 6, 2018), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/immigration/2018/06/06/
reports-turning-back-asylum-seekers-border-crossings-trump-tightens-grip-zero-toleranceimmigration-policies ('Immigration advocates are accusing U.S. border guards of refusing
asylum-seekers entry to the U.S. at a bustling pedestrian bridge into the downtown of this city
next to the Rio Grande.").
347. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 26, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Kelly,
No. 2:17-cv-5111 (C.D. Cal. July 12,2017).
348. Id at 27.
349. Id at 28.
350. See Moore, supranote 102.
351. SecretaryNielsen Talks Immigration, Relationship with Trump, Fox NEWS (May
15, 2018), https//video.foxnews.com/v/5785340898001/#sp=show-clips (quoted material
begins at 03:20).
352. Statementfrom CommissionerKevin McAleenan on Operationsat San Ysidro Port
ofEntry, U.S. CusToMs & BORDER PROTECTIoN (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/news

2019]

EXECUTIVE OVERREACHING

765

Asylum seekers awaiting processing have had to sleep on
international bridges on the Mexico side of the border, exposed to the
elements and at risk of violence.353 Rape, kidnapping, extortion, and
execution of migrants are all widespread in the northern part of
Mexico.35 4 While most of these asylum seekers are from Central
America, some are also from Mexico, which means they are forced to
wait in the same country where they fear persecution.
Between May and June 2018, the number of people admitted at
ports of entry plunged by 42%.ss During this same period, the number
of families apprehended between ports decreased only 8%, suggesting
that the 42% drop was due not to fewer people trying to reach the
United States but to restrictions to entry.356 Asylum seekers bad to wait
in line at ports for days or weeks before getting a chance to apply for
asylum.35 1 CBP officers did not even record who was in line, leaving
asylum seekers to do this themselves. 3 58
While CBP blames the processing delays on operational
constraints, its own description of its capacity calls into question that
claim. The largest port of entry is San Ysidro, which, according to CBP,
can hold 300 to 800 people, yet CBP processes only 20 to 80 people
there per day.359 In fact, records produced by the government during
litigation reveal that nearly half of the space CBP has available for
asylum seekers remains unoccupied." Recent statements by DHS
room/speeches-and-statements/statement-commissioner-kevin-mealeenan-operations-sanysidro-port.
353. See id; see also Nathan, supra note 346 ("Even so, the practice of turning
immigrants away has suddenly become routine, creating chilling scenes of immigrants and
children camped out near the bridges, exposed to sun, wind, and rain, amid make-do bedding,
scattered clothing, and trash.").
354. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 346, at 16.
355. Dara Lind, Beyond Family Separation: Thmp's Ongoing War on Asylum,
Explained, Vox (Aug. 6, 2018), https*//www.vox.com/explainers/2018/8/6/17501404/trumpasylum-separate-legal-definition (citing ADAM ISACSON ET AL., WASH. OFFICE ON LATIN AM.,
'COME BAcK LATER': CHALLENGES FOR ASYLYM SEEKERS WAITING AT POR'I OF ENTRY 3
(2018), https://www.wola.orgwp-content/uploads/2018/08/Ports-of-Entry-ReportPDFvers3.pdf).
356. Id
357. See id
358. See id
359. STEPHANIE LEUTERT ET AL, ASYLUM PROCESSING AND WAITLISTS AT THE U.S.MEXICO BORDER 2-5(2018), https*//www.strausscenter.org/images/MSI/AsylumReportMSI.
pdf.
360. See Amicus Curiae Briefof Nineteen Organizations Representing Asylum Seekers
at 5, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 3:17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (filed Feb. 21, 2019),
https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2019/02/Amicus%/2Brief%2Oof%2019%200r
gso2Owho20Represent/20Asylum%2OSeekers/2020 19.02.21/*20223.pdf.
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personnel also point clearly towards deterrence, not inadequate
capacity, as the real reason for limiting asylum seekers' access to ports
of entry.361
While some commentators describe turning back asylum seekers
as "a de facto, unofficial policy,"3 62 a class action filed in July 2017 by
the nonprofit organization Al Otro Lado and six asylum seekers
contends that it is an official policy sanctioned by the Trump
Administration.36 3 In addition to discussing the number of cases
documented by reputable organizations, the plaintiffs stress that a
member of CBP leadership, John Wagner, acknowledged CBP's plan
to "limit the number of migrants entering U.S. [ports of entry] at any
given time" in testimony to Congress." The complaint asserts that this
policy of turning back asylum seekers violates the INA, APA, Due
Process Clause, and the doctrine of non-refoulement.6 s
The government filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, denying the
existence of any official policy but not disputing the documented cases
of CBP officers denying people the right to apply for asylum.3 6 Rather,
the government pointed out that the "125 alleged denials out of 8,000
appropriate referrals to USCIS" represents just 1.6% of cases handled
by 24,000 CBP officers managing 328 ports of entry.3 6' According to
the government, the reports on which plaintiffs rely at most
demonstrate "uncoordinated and unauthorized actions by a handful of
individual officers." 6
361. See, e.g., Manny Fernandez et al., The Price of Trump's Migrant Deterrence
Strategy: New Chaos on the Border, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/

2019/01/04/us/mexico-wall-policy-iup.html (quoting a DHS official as saying that the
Trump Administration's focus is on "how can we deter, rather than how can we handle").
362. See B. Shaw Drake & Elizabeth Gibson, Vanishing Protection:Access to Asylum
at the Border, 21 CUNY L. REv. 91, 137-39 (2017); see alsoHUMANRIGHTSFUIST, supranote

346, at 1 ("The U.S. government is illegally turning away asylum seekers at official land
crossings all along the southern border.").
363. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief supra note 347.
364. Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1, Al Otro Lado, Inc.
v. Duke, No. 2:17-cv-05111-JFW (JPRx) (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2018) (quoting John Wagner's
testimony to Congress); see Immigration and Customs Enforcement & Customs and Border
ProtectionFYI8 Budget Request: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on HomelandSec. of the H

AppropriationsComm., 115th Cong. 2 (2017) (statement of Carla Provost, U.S. Border Patrol
Acting Chief U.S. Customs & Border Prot, and John Wagner, Office of Field Operations
Deputy Exec. Assistant Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.).
365. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief; supranote 347, at 52.
366. See Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) at 10, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Duke, No. 2:17-cy-0511I1JFW-JPR (C.D. Cal. Oct 12,2017).
367. Id at 12.
368. Id at 17.
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In August 2018, the district court granted the government's
motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part.16' The court found that
the APA provided the relevant framework for considering the alleged
policy, noting that the due process claim expressly incorporated the
alleged APA violations.?"o The court found the individual plaintiffs had
standing to seek relief under section 706(1) of the APA to compel the
defendants to inspect and process them for admissions, as well as to
request this relief for a putative class of other asylum seekers who
experienced the same failures to act.37' However, the court found that
the complaint failed to state a claim under section 706(2) of the APA
regarding an alleged policy.3 72 The court found no order or regulation
that constitutes or reflects a policy applicable to all CBP officials at
ports of entry, nor any evidence of an unwritten policy.373
The dispute over whether the Trump Administration or the CBP
has any type of policy of denying asylum seekers who present
themselves at ports of entry reflects a lack of transparency around the
agency's operations. If a policy exists, it is likely unwritten and based
on verbal directives or requests. 374 The Obama Administration, for
example, adopted an unwritten, de facto policy of detaining migrant
families during the 2014 surge in asylum seekers that was "reemphasized" after the 2016 presidential election.3"' Based on data
showing that the release rate of asylum seekers who crossed at ports of
entry plummeted from 80% in 2012 to 47% in 2015, the District Court
for the District of Columbia found that an unwritten policy existed,
constituting final agency action that allowed judicial review. 376 A
similar drop in asylum applications at ports of entry could help
establish a policy of denying asylum seekers the right to apply.
369. Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20,
2018).
370. Id at 45,49.
371. Idat4l.
372. Id
373. Id at 50,52-53; see also 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) ("Agency action made reviewable
by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review.").
374. Courts have considered unwritten policies as final agency action reviewable under
the APA. See, e.g., Aracely, R. v. Nielsen, 319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 123 (D.D.C. 2018) (alleging
a "de facto immigration policy promulgated by high-level officials in Washington D.C.");
R.LL-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164,174 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding that plaintiffs had shown
the existence of a 'DHS policy direct[ing] ICE officers to consider deterrence of mass
migration as a factor in their custody determinations").
375. Aracely, R., 319 F. Supp. 3d at 123, 149.
376. Id at 123, 138-39.
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The policy of deterrence may extend even beyond asylum seekers
themselves to the attorneys and organizer seeking to assist them. In
March 2019, a source within DHS leaked information to the press
showing that DHS is keeping files and placing passport alerts on certain
immigration attorneys, organizers, and journalists involved with
asylum seekers.' Both the Legal Director and Litigation and Policy
Director of Al Otro Lado, the organization that challenged the policy
and practice of turning asylum seekers away from ports of entry, were
deported from Mexico in early 2019 and told by Mexican officials that
a passport alert had been placed on them by a foreign government,
which they believe to be United States.3 78 This type of harassment and
retaliation against individuals working to shed light on violations of
asylum seekers' rights appears intended to deter them from continuing
this line of work and compounds the efforts to deter asylum seekers
themselves.
B.

CriminallyProsecutingAsylum Seekers

Although the government disputes an official policy of turning
back asylum seekers at ports of entry, it cannot dispute that former
Attorney General Sessions publicly announced a policy of criminally
prosecuting all noncitizens who enter the United States illegally,
While deportation proceedings are
including asylum seekers.
illegal reentry are criminal offenses
entry
and
technically civil, illegal
that can be prosecuted. Iegal entry is a misdemeanor punishable by
up to six months for the first offense and a felony punishable by up to
two years for subsequent offenses. 7 Illegal reentry, meaning returning
to the United States after being deported, is a felony that can be

377. Tom Jones et al., Source: Leaked Docunents Show US. Government Tracking
JournalistsandImmigrationAdvocates Through a Secret Database,NBC SAN DIEGO (Mar 6,
2019), https://www.nbesandiego.com/news/local/Source-Leaked-Documents-Show-the-USGovernment-Tracking-Journalists-and-Advocates-Through-a-Secret-Database-506783231.
html.
378. Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Court Filing Seeks Information
Regarding Retaliation Against Immigrants' Rights Attorneys at Southern Border (Feb. 27,
2019), https://ccjustice.org/home/pressenter/press-releases/court-filing-seeks-informationregarding-retaliation-against; Kate Linthicum et al., Immigrant Rights Attorneys and
JournalistsDeniedEntry into Mexico, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https-1/www.latimes.com/
nationimmigrationla-me-immigration-attorneys-detained-20190202-story.html Kate Momsey,
Volunteers, Activists, JournalistsInterrogatedat BorderAbout Caravan,L.A TIMES (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.ltimes.com/local/la-me-immigration-activists-journalists-interrogated-20
190211-story.html
379. 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012).
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punished by up to ten or twenty years, depending on the defendant's
criminal history.3 80

The Obama Administration focused significant resources on
By 2012,
prosecuting these offenses, particularly felonies.
immigration-related prosecutions were twenty-eight times higher than
twenty years earlier.38' By 2016, over half of all federal prosecutions
were for immigration-related offenses. 382 However, the Obama
Administration generally did not prosecute asylum seekers or first-time
entrants. 383 In fact, a 2015 report by the DHS Office of the Inspector
General warned that referring "asylum seekers for criminal prosecution
may violate U.S. obligations under the Refugee Convention and its
Protocol.""
This quickly changed, however, after Trump took office. On
January 25, 2017, days after his inauguration, Trump issued an
executive order instructing the DOJ to make criminal prosecutions for
unlawful entry a "high priority."38 In 2017, Attorney General Sessions
instructed federal prosecutors to make "immigration offenses higher
priorities," target "first-time improper entrants,"3 86 and "charge and
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense."387 Between April
and May 2017, immigration prosecutions increased by nearly 27%.8
While some asylum seekers were prosecuted for illegal entry in
2017, this became much more widespread in May 2018, when Sessions
announced a "zero tolerance" policy, stating, "If you cross the
Southwest border unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It's that
380. Id

§ 1326(a)-(b).

381. MICHAEL T. LIGHT ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR, THE RISE OF FEDERAL
IMMIGRATION CRIMES: UNLAWFUL REENTRY DRIVES GROWrH (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.

pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-ferl-immigration-crimes/.
382. TRANSACITONAL RECORDs AcCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION Now 52
PERCENT OF ALL FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRosEcuTIoNs (2016), https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/

crim/446/.
383.

See HUMAN RIGHTs

FIRST, THE RIS

IN CRIMINAL PROSECUIONS OF ASYLUM

SEEKERS 1 (2017), https*//wwhmanrg sorg/sites/default/files/hrf-criminal-prosecutionof-asylum-seekers.pdf.
384. Id
385. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30,2017).
386. Memorandum from U.S. Att'y Gen. Jeff Sessions to All Federal Prosecutors
Regarding Renewed Commitment to Criminal Immigration Enforcement 1-2 (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-releaselfile/956841/download.
387. Memorandum from U.S. Att'y Gen. Jeff Sessions to All Federal Prosecutors
Regarding Department Charging and Sentencing Policy 1 (May 10, 2017), https*//www.
justice.gov/opalpress-release/fde/965896/download.
388.

TRANSACTIONALRECORDSACCESSCLEARINGHOUSE,IMMIGRATIONPROSECUTIONS

FOR MAY 2017 (2017), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlymayl7/fil/.
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simple." 8 9 He also threatened to prosecute parents traveling with
children for smuggling a child.39 Sessions dispatched thirty-five
additional U.S. attorneys and eighteen more Us to the border to handle

*

the increased workload generated by these prosecutions." He stated
that his goal was to prosecute "100 percent" of people who entered
without authorization.3
During the first half of FY2018, 35,787
individuals were prosecuted for immigration violations.9
Criminally prosecuting asylum seekers for illegal entry or illegal
reentry raises serious concerns under international and U.S. law.3
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention prohibits imposing "penalties"
on refugees "on account of their illegal entry or presence."

The

UNHCR has confirmed that such penalties include "being charged with
immigration or criminal offences related to the seeking of asylum."
U.S. law also recognizes this principle of not penalizing asylum seekers

for acts related to seeking asylum. For example, the federal regulations
provide that asylum seekers should not be fined for document fraud
related to their ffight from a country,39 and the Ninth Circuit has held

that it is inappropriate to consider manner of entry into the United
States as an adverse discretionary factor in adjudicating asylum
cases.39 1 In A-B-, however, Sessions suggested the opposite, urging IJs

389. Miriam Jordan & Ron Nixon, Thmp Administration Theuatens Jail and
Separating Childrenfrom Parents for Those Who llegally Cross &uthwest Border, N.Y.
TImES (May 7, 2018), https://wwwnytimes.com/2018/05/07/us/politics/homeland-securityprosecute-undocumented-immigrants.htmL
390. Id
391. Id
392. Id
393. Id
394. See Natasha Arnpriester, TrmpingAsyIWn: CriminalProsecutionsfor "Blegal"
Entry and Reentry Violate the Rights ofAsyhon Seekers, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 3, 18-19
(2017).
395. Refugee Convention, supranote 45, art. 31.
396. Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Introductory Note, in CONVENTION
AND PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFuGEEs 2, 3 (Dec. 2010), https://www.
unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10; see also Office of the U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, para. 28, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/Eng/REV. 1 (1979,
rev. 1992), http://www.unhcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf (explaining that being a "refugee" does not
require the state to recognize that status but simply requires satisfying the definition of a
refugee).
397. See 8 C.F.R. § 270.2(j) (2018).
398. See Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 917-19 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the U
abused his discretion in denying asylum based on the asylum seeker's use of fiaudulent
documents to reach the United States).
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to consider illegal entry as a factor that would support a discretionary
denial of asyluni 3
Although prosecuting someone for an immigration offense does
not prohibit that person from submitting an asylum application, the
underlying purpose of these prosecutions is clearly to deter people from
seeking asylum in the United States. Criminal prosecutions discourage
asylum applications by frightening already traumatized asylum seekers
and placing them injail." Prosecuting asylum seekers for entering the
country illegally is especially wrong if that is the only way they can
enter because they are tumed away from ports of entry.
Even after the administration stopped criminally prosecuting
asylum seekers for illegal entry and reentry, it continued to describe
asylum seekers as criminals. For example, DHS Secretary Nielsen
criticized the media in November 2018 for portraying the migrant
caravan as a sympathetic group composed primarily of women and
children, stating that it includes "500 criminals" and "known gang
CBP Commissioner McAleenan likewise claimed to
members."
of participation of over 500 individuals with
"information
have
criminal records as part of the caravan."o2 And President Trump
described the caravan as consisting of "bad thugs and gang
Such comments seek to
members'"0 and "stone cold criminals."
build public support for the Administration's efforts to limit the
availability of asylum and for deterrence more generally by portraying
asylum seekers as criminals.

399. 27 1. & N. Dec. 316,345 n.12 (A.G. 2018) ("I remind all asylum adjudicators that
a favorable exercise of discretion is a discrete requirement for the granting of asylum and
should not be presumed or glossed over solely because an applicant otherwise meets the burden
of proof for asylum eligibility under the INA.").
400. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 383, at 4.
401. Richard Gonzales, DHS Chief Visits US.-Mexico Border, Defends
Administration'sAsylon Rules, NPR (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/20/669
(quoting
826023/dhs-chief-visits-u-s-mexico-border-defendsedministrations-asylum-rules
Secretary Nielsen at a news conference on the U.S.-Mexico border).
402. Bart Jansen & Alan Gomez, PresidentThmp Calls CaravanAnmigrants 'Stone
Cold Criminals.' Here's What We Know, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2018), https-//www.usa
today.com/story/news/2018/1 126/president-trump-Inigrant-caravan-criminals/2112846002
(quoting CBP Commissioner McAleenan).
403. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldfrump), TwrrrER (Oct. 31, 2018, 8:45 AM EST),
https/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/statustl057614564639019009?s=20.
404. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTnmp), TWIrrER (Nov. 26,2018,7:19 AM EST),
https/twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1067015026995879937?s=20.
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SeparatingParentsfiomChildren

While family separation attracted widespread public attention in
the spring and summer of 2018, it began long before then. In 2016,
under President Obama, staff within the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR), part ofthe U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), began informally tracking migrant children who had
been separated from their parents by DHS.` In the summer of 2017,
ORR observed that the percentage of children who were separated from
their parents increased over tenfold from just 0.3% of all
unaccompanied minors in late 2016 to 3.6% by August 2017.' The
ORR also noted that many of the separated children were very young
and therefore required placement at special facilities. 7 The ORR
estimates receiving thousands of separated children in this time period,
although the exact number remains unknown."
In April 2018, after the Trump Administration instituted a "zero
tolerance" policy, a new, much more visible phase of family separation
began. DHS began separating children from their parents when they
were apprehended together at the border." The parents were placed in
the custody of the U.S. Marshalls Service while awaiting prosecution;
the children were then treated as unaccompanied minors and
transferred to ORR custody.410 They were sent to over a hundred
different facilities for children all across the United States.4 1 1 The Vast
majority of these children came from Guatemala (56%) and Honduras
(33%).412
Between April and June 2018, the separation of children erupted
into a nationwide scandal. President Trump and DHS Secretary
Nielsen initially denied having a policy of separating children, but the
Administration's internal documents contradicted that assertion.413
405. OFFICE OF THE INSPECIOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN RES., OEI-BL18-00511, SEPARATED CHILDREN PLACED IN OFFIcE OF REFUOEE RESETTLEMENT CARE 6
(2019), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-BL-18-0051 1.pdf.
406. Id
407. Id
408. Id
409. Id at 4.
410. Id
411. Family Separation by the Numbers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/
mmntsnd-detention/fily-separation
(last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
412.

Id

413. Alex Lockie, Conclusive Pmof That It Is Thanp's Policy to Separate Childen
from Their Families at the Border, Bus. INsIDER (June 18, 2018), https*//www.business
insider.comump-admnistration-policy-separating-children-border-cbp-dhs-2018-6.
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Accounts emerged of CBP agents separating children as a way to
coerce their desperate parents into signing deportation orders.414 CBP
agents also lied to parents, telling them their children would be taken
away temporarily for a bath or a doctor's visit but then sent the children
hundreds or thousands of miles away to shelters run by the ORR."'
Audio recordings and videos of young children crying out for their
parents provoked a national outcry.
Once Trump realized the unpopularity of the family separation
policy, he blamed Democrats for it, claiming that their "bad legislation"
was the problem and that he had no choice in the matter.4 16 However,
no law required children to be separated from their parents at the
border. Trump finally ended the policy of separating children on June
20, 2018, by signing an order that allowed parents to stay in the custody
of DHS while being prosecuted for illegal entry and directing DHS to
detain families together whenever "appropriate and consistent with the
law and available resources."" Shortly thereafter, the CBP announced
that it was no longer referring parents for criminal prosecution.4 18
A few days later, on June 26, 2018, a federal judge issued a
nationwide injunction in a class action lawsuit filed by the ACLU in
February 2018 challenging family separations by DHS as a violation
of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment4 1 9 The
injunction ordered the government to reunite parents with children
under five within fourteen days and with all other children within thirty
days.420 It also prohibited ICE from deporting parents without their
children unless the parent "affirmatively, knowingly, and voluntarily"
agreed to be deported alone. 421
414. Jay Root & Shannon Najmabadi, Kids in Exchangefor Deportation: Detained
MigrantsSay They Were Told They Could GetKids Back on Way Out of US., TX TIUB. (June
24, 2018), https://www.texastrbme.org/2018/0624/dds-exchange-deportation-migrantsclaim-they-were-promised-they-could/.
415. See Katy Vine, What's Really Happening When Asylum-Seeking Families Are
Separted?, TEX. MONTHLY (June 15, 2018), https://www.texasmonthly.com/news/whatsreally-happening-asylum-seeking-families-separated/.
416. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Taking Migrant Children from ParentsIs Illegal, UN.
Tells U.S., N.Y. TIMas (June 5,2018), https-/www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/worid/americas/
us-un-migrant-children-families.btml.
417. Exec. Order 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 25, 2018).
418. Associated Press, Customs andBorderProtectionHeadSays Agency Has Stopped
Refeng Immigrant Parentsfor Criminal Prosecution,POLITCO (June 25, 2018), https/
www.politico.com/story/2018/06/25/customs-border-protection-immigrant-parents-criminalprosecution-670358.
419. Ms. Lv. ICE, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
420. Id at 1149.
421. Id

774

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 93:707

In July 2018, the government provided the court with data
showing that it had separated 2654 children from their parents in the
spring and summer of that year as a result of the zero-tolerance policy,
including over one thousand children under the age of ten and 103
children under the age five.'" This data did not include the thousands
of children who had been separated from their parents before the zerotolerance policy went into effect, because the government had not
properly tracked the children's placements.'* In addition, parents who
had been separated from their children were excluded as class members
if the government deemed them to be unfit or to pose a danger to the
child, for example because of a criminal history or a communicable
disease, or if they voluntarily declined to be reunited with the child.4 24
The ORR also excluded children from the list provided to the court if
they were separated from nonparents relatives, such as siblings or
grandparents, if they had a fraudulent birth certificate, or if the case file
had conflicting or unclear information.4 25
On August 27, 2018, two months after the injunction was issued,
the government reported that 497 children who were class members
still remained separated from their parents. 426 A status report submitted
to the court on October 15, 2018, indicated that 120 children were still
in custody waiting to be unified and that 125 children had chosen to
pursue asylum in the United States even after their parents were
ordered deported. 427 No one knows for sure whether these figures are
accurate, as DHS has been unable to provide accurate and complete
data regarding family separations, 428 in part because HSS lacks an
integrated data system to track separated families.42 9

422. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECIOR GEN., supm note 405, at 1; Family Separation by the
Numbers, supranote 411.
423. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECIOR GEN., supra note 405, at 6.
424. Id at 4, 10.
425. Id at 7-8.
426. Leslie Shapiro & Manas Sharma, How Many Mgrant ChildrenAre Still Separated
from Their Families?, WASH. PosT, https*//www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/local/
tracking-migrant-family-separation (last updated Aug. 30, 2018).
427. Family Separationby the Numbers, supranote 411.
428. Id
429. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supranote 405, at 2. Despite the injunction,
family separations continue to occur. The Office of the Inspector General's report released in
January 2019 found that 118 children were separated from their parents between July 1, 2018,
and November 7, 2018. It also reported that the proportion of separated children increased
between July and November 2018 at a rate two times higher than what the ORR observed in
2016. Id at 11.
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The trauma of separation has severe short- and long-term impacts
on children's mental and physical health.430 It "disrupt[s] the
architecture of a child's brain" and induces severe stress." Research
shows that prolonged separation from parents is associated with higher
rates of anxiety and depression, and that immigrant children in shelters
may have an increased risk of post-traumatic stress disorder.432 In fact
some studies have found that family separation is on par with beatings
and torture in its impact on mental health.433 Placing young children in
institutional settings also affects their neurobehavioral development,
negatively impacting the brain's prefrontal cortex, which plays a
critical role in executive function.4 34 The harm of family separation
may also result in detachment from family members, relationship
difficulties, developmental delays, and diminished cognitive
functioning.4 35
Given the cruel and lifelong impact of family separation on
children, its use to deter asylum seekers is particularly shocking. Yet
the extreme cruelty of the policy is precisely why the administration
thought it would be such an effective deterrent. Recent information
suggests the scale of separation is even greater than previously thought,
indicating that upwards of 5000 children have been taken from their
parents since Trump became President 436 Trump publicly affirmed the
goal of deterrence in late 2018, telling reporters at the White House, "If
they feel there will be separation, they don't come." 3 Such comments
indicate that the Administration has not yet abandoned the idea of using

430. See Beth Van Schaak, The Torture of Forcibly Separating Childrenfrom Their
Parents,JUST SECURITY (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/61138/torture-forciblyseparating-children-parents/.
431. Jeremy Rai 'The Separation Was So Long. My Son Has Changed So Muck,'
ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/trumpfamily-separation-children-border/569584/ (quoting Julie Linton, co-chair of the American
Academic of Pediatrics Immigrant Health Special Interest Group).
432. Heather Stringer, PsychologistsRespond to a Mental Health Crisisat the Border,
AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N, https://www.apa.org/news/apa/2018/border-family-separation (last
visited Mar. 9, 2019).
433. See id
434. Id
435. Beth Van Schaack, New ProofSurfaces That Family Separation Was About
Deterrence and Punishment, JUST SECURIY (Nov. 27, 2018), https*//www.justsecurity.org/
61621/proof-surfaces-family-separation-deterrence-punishment/.
436. Id
437. David Shepardson, Trump Says Fainly SeparationsDeter Illegal Immigration,
REUTERS (Oct. 13, 2018), https*//www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-trump/trumpsays-family-separations-deter-imegal-immigration-idUSKCN1MOOOC.
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cruel asylum policies to deter people from exercising their legal right
to seek asylum in the United States.
VI. PROTECTION FROM ExEcuTIVE OVERREACHING
The three types of executive actions described above-political
interference with adjudicators, abuse of the Attorney General review
mechanism, and preventing adjudication from taking place-extend
the executive's reach into adjudication in unconventional and deeply
troubling ways. These actions not only tread on individual rights but
also undermine processes and procedures that Congress established by
statute. Furthermore, former Attorney General Sessions's decisions
and revised USCIS guidance conflict with judicial precedents and
longstanding interpretations of asylum law. Because these actions raise
separation of powers concerns, it is important to consider how the
judicial and legislative branches can help cabin executive interference
in immigration adjudication. In addition, career staff within the EOIR
and the USCIS who are responsible for these adjudications should
consider ways for the agency to insulate itself from presidential
interference.
A.

JudicialReview

Of all the ways to protect against executive overreaching, judicial
review is one of the most important, but it is also the most limited. As
explained in Part II above, judicial review is limited in the immigration
context by the plenary power doctrine when it comes to the admission
and exclusion of noncitizens. For noncitizens already in the country,
however, courts have greater powers of review. Under a President who
pushes the boundaries of executive power, courts must ensure robust
protection of the constitutional rights of noncitizens, including due
process in credible fear interviews, asylum interviews, and removal
proceedings. While the INA also limits judicial review in many types
of cases, courts always retain jurisdiction over legal and constitutional
questions in appeals challenging removal orders.""
The question of how much deference courts should give to
administrative agencies is particularly pressing in the immigration
context. Commentators have argued that traditional Chevrondeference
should not apply in immigration cases for various reasons. Some stress
the inconsistencies in the Board's decisions, while others focus on the
438.

8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(aX2)(D) (2012).
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Attorney General's lack of immigration expertise, or the unique role of
international law in asylum cases that sets them apart from most
administrative adjudications.4 39 To the extent that Chevron US.A. Inc.
v. NaturalResources Defense Council applies, the first part of the test,
which asks whether Congress has spoken directly to the issue, becomes
especially important under an aggressive executive whose policies may
conflict with rights and procedures established in the INA.'o
The USCIS guidance that instructs asylum officers to ignore
federal court precedents that conflict with A-B- also raises questions
about the application ofNational Cable& TelecommunicationAss'n v.
BrandXInternet Services, which held that an agency's interpretation
prevails even when a court has previously adopted a contrary
interpretation."' But the judiciary, not the agency, must decide whether
BrandX applies in any given situation. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit specifically held that an agency's
interpretation is not "legally effective" until a court, in deference to the
agency, overrules itself. 2 Then-Judge Gorsuch wrote both the
majority and a concurring opinion in that case, arguing against the
Chevron doctrine. His concurrence describes the "elephant in the
room" as the possibility of constitutional separation of powers
problems with both Chevron and Brand X, and it warns against
"abdication of the judicial duty."' At a minimum, courts should be
wary of an agency advising asylum officers to apply BrandX as a
blanket rule. Given that BrandXinvolves complex administrative law
questions far beyond the training of asylum officers who do not even
need to be lawyers, it is highly problematic for the agency to instruct
them to ignore federal precedents.
The executive actions discussed above also provide good reasons
for the judiciary to be cautious in exercising the heightened deference
traditionally given to the President and administrative agencies during
national emergencies."' The Trump Administration has attempted to
439. See, e.g., Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in US. Refugee Law:
InternationalistPaths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2011).
440. See 467 U.S. 837, 842(1984).
441. See 545 U.S. 967,974, 1002-03 (2005).
442. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1145 (10th Cir. 2016).
443. Id. at 1149, 1152 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
444. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian A&Mnistrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095,
1097 (2009) ("Administrative law is built around a series of open-ended standards or adjustable
parameters-for example, what counts as 'arbitrary' or 'unreasonable,' whether evidence is
'substantial,' whether a statute is or is not 'clear'-that courts can and do adjust during
perceived emergencies to increase deference to administrative agencies.").
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manufacture an immigration "crisis" in order to justify the extreme
policies discussed above."' But the government's own data undercuts
this claim."' Furthermore, recidivism rates-the percentage of
individuals apprehended by Border Patrol more than once within a
fiscal year-have been dropping over the past five years."
If one drills down into Trump's assertion of an immigration crisis,
it appears that the claim depends less on the number of immigrants
entering the country than the type of people coming." The concern is
not really about a criminal threat, as less than three percent of
individuals apprehended by Border Patrol are criminals or gang
445. See Eleanor Acer, Trump's FabricatedBorder Crisis,HUM. RTs. FIRsT (Apr. 12,
2018), https/www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/trumps-fabricated-border-crisis ("Loaded with
false claims, alternative facts and glaring omissions, the president's rhetoric and tactics,
culminating in the direction to deploy the National Guard, are an overblown PR stunt aimed at
pressuring Congress to enact some of the president's most extreme immigration policies.");
Stuart Anderson, There Is No Crisisat the Borde-m DHS Stats Prove It, FoRBEs (June 25,
2018), https*//www.forbes.com/sites/Mrtanderson/2018/0625/there-is-no-crisis-at-the-boderand-dhs-stats-prove-it/#554ffc7al 12a ("At a June 21, 2018, cabinet meeting, Donald Trump
talked about 'the illegal immigration crisis on the southern border.' But data coming from his
own administration show there is no such crisis."); Noah Smith, What Immigration Crisis?
The US. Isn't Being SwampeA BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2018), https-//www.bloomberg.com/
view/articles/2018-06-26/what-immigration-crisis-the-u-s-isn-t-being-swamped ("Trump and
his advisers, particularly Stephen Miller, have portrayed illegal entry across the Mexican
border as a mounting crisis, necessitating dramatic action. Nothing could be further from the
truth...."); Fareed Zakaria, Thunp Is MAmufacturing an Immigration Crisis. Here's Why
That Helps Him., WASH. POST (May 3, 2018), https*//www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
trump-is-manufactuing-an-immigration-crisis-heres-why-that-helps-him/2018/05/032db611
d2-4fDe-11e8-af46-bld6dcOd9bfestory.html? ("As for Mexican migration, even before
Trump's rise, more Mexicans were leaving the United States than entering.").
446. See Anderson, supranote 445.
447. CBP Enforcement Statistics FY2018, U.S. CUSToMs & BORDER PROTECION,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics-fy20l8 (last visited Feb.
12, 2019). Recidivism dropped from 16% in FY2013 to 10% in FY2017. Id
448. A study by the Public Religion Research Institute and the Atlanticbased on surveys
conducted before and after the 2016 election found that the best predictor of support for Trump
was fear about immigrants and cultural displacement, even more than economic and other
concerns. Daniel Cox et al., Beyond Economics: Fearsof CulturalDisplacementPushed the
White Working Class to Thnp, Pun. REDGION REs. INSTJATLANTic (May 9, 2017), https/
www.prri.org/esearch/white-working-class-attitudes-economy-trade-immigration-electiondonald-trump/. These supporters included white, working class voters who felt "like a stranger
in their own land" and believed that "the American way of life needs to be protected from
foreign influence." Id Additionally, those who favored deporting more unauthorized
immigrants were over three times as likely to vote for Trump compared to those who did not
share these views. Id; see also Emma Green, It Was CulturalAnxiety That Drove White,
Working-Class Voters to Thanp, ATLANIC (May 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/05/white-working-class-trump-cultural-anxiety/525771/ ("Besides partisan
affiliation, it was cultural anxiety-feeling like a stranger in America, supporting the
deportation of immigrants, and hesitating about educational investment--that best predicted
support for Trump.").

2019]

EXECUTIVE OVERREACHZNG

779

members."' Rather, the real fear is a racial and cultural threat. As a
candidate, Trump promised to enact a "total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States." 0 As President, he said he would
prefer immigrants from Norway (a Christian, white, wealthy country)
instead of individuals from "shithole" countries like Haiti, El Salvador,
and African nations. 451 When asked about immigration to Europe,
Trump stated, "I think they better watch themselves because you are
changing culture . . . ."" He described cultural change as "a very
negative thing for Europe,"" stressing that "[w]e don't want what is
happening with immigration in Europe to happen with us!"' Such
comments resonate with some white Americans who feel threatened by
the prospect of becoming a minority race.
The plenary power's deep roots in racial animus, beginning with
the Chinese Exclusion Case, indicate a close connection between an
expansive view of executive immigration powers, limited judicial
review, and a perceived crisis created by a racial or cultural threat.456
449. CBP Enforcement StatisticsFY2018, supranote 447. Of the 310,531 individuals
that Border Patrol apprehended nationwide in FY2017, only 8531 (2.7%) had criminal
convictions. In the first part of FY2018 (Oct 1, 2017-Aug. 31, 2018), only 1.7% of all
apprehensions by Border Patrol were convicted criminals. The number of gang members
apprehended is even smaller, just 536 people in FY2017 (.0017% of all apprehensions).
450. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for 'Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims
Entering the United States,' WASH. PosT (Dec. 7, 2015), https*//www.washingtonpostcom/
news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-tump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-ofmuslims-entering-the-united-states/ (quoting Trump at a rally in December 2015).
451. See John Bowden, Blumenthal: Thanp's 'S-hole' Comment Is 'Racism
MasqueradingPoorly as ImmigrationPolicy,'HaL (Jan. 11, 2018), https/thehill.com/blogs/
blog-briefing-room/news/368628-bhmenthal-trnmps-s-holecomment-is-racism-masqeraingpoorly; Mike Lillis, Hoyer: Trump's Immigration Comments Are 'Racist and a Disgrace,'
Hil (Jan. 11, 2018), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/368652-hoyer-trumps-immigrationcomments-are-racist-and-a-disgrace.
452. Collinson, supra note 36.
453. Wagner, supra note 39. Similarly, after tweeting (falsely) that "[c]rime in
Germany is way up," he continued "[b]ig mistake made all over Europe in allowing millions
of people in who have so strongly and violently changed their culture!" Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TwrrrER (June 18,2018, 8:02 AM EST), https*//twitter.com/realdonald
trump/status/1008696508697513985.
454. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwrrER (June 18,2018, 8:04 AM EST),
https*//twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1008696952559734787.
455. See Olga Khazan, People Votedfor ThunpBecause They Were Anxious, Not Poor,
ATLANnc (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/sciencetarchive/2018/04/existentialanxiety-not-poverty-motivates-trump-support/558674/.
456. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation'sLast Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1, 10 (1998) ("The plenary power
doctrine cases may have been decided as they were because of the race of the aliens
involved."); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the ImmigrationLaws, and Domestic Race Relations:A
"Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness, 73 IND. LJ. 1111, 1115 (1998) ("Besides
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Giving deference to executive immigration actions just because the
President declares a national crisis, without looking deeper to see if
there is any objective evidence of a crisis or if it is rooted in racial or
religious animus, risks eroding our most deeply held constitutional
values.
Courts also should not be so blinded by deference that they fail to
intervene when the President's actions conflict with statutes enacted by
Congress. The Fifth Circuit found that President Obama had gone too
far in adopting Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents (DAPA) as a policy, reasoning that this
impermissibly suspended statutory requirements.4 57 An evenly divided
Supreme Court did not address the issue further. If courts were willing
to reject DAPA as being inconsistent with the statute, then they should
also carefully consider whether Trump's policies conflict with the
statutory rights and procedures surrounding credible fear interviews
and asylum applications.
B.

Legislative Reform

Legislative reforms can also help protect against executive
overreaching in immigration adjudication. To protect against the
problem of political interference with adjudicators, discussed in Part III
above, Congress can restructure the immigration court system.
Proposals to do this go back decades but still have not been
implemented.4 5 8 Us, the American Bar Association, and the Federal
Bar Association all support such restructuring.4 59 In April 2018, the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Border Security and
Immigration held a hearing concerning the immigration court system
that considered several options for increasing the independence of
analyzing the history surrounding legal exclusions in the immigration laws, I argue that the
exclusionary laws reveal majority sentiment about racial minorities in the United States.").
457. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 187-88 (5th Cir. 2015), af'd, 136 S. Ct. 2271
(2016).
458. See Susan Benesch, Due Process and Decisionmaking in US. Immigration
Adjudication, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 557,567 (2007) (noting that in 1981, the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy recommended establishing an immigration court to replace
immigration judges and the Board); Legomsky, supra note 124, at 1640.
459. See AM. BAR Ass'N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO
PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONAuSM IN THE ADJUDICATION
OF REMOVAL CASEs 2-36 to 2-42 (2010); Christine Lockhart Poarch, The FBA 'sProposalfor

the Creation of a Federal Immigration Court, FED. LAW., Apr. 2014, at 10; Elizabeth J.
Stevens, Making Our 'ImmigrationCourts' Courts, FED. LAW., Mar. 2018, at 17; Statement of
J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 8, at 12.
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Us." These options included creating an immigration court with trial
and appellate tribunals outside of the executive branch, creating a new
and independent agency within the executive branch that has trial-level
Us and a review board, and designing a hybrid approach that places
trial-level IJs in an independent administrative agency within the
executive branch and an appellate tribunal outside the executive
branch."'
The Federal Bar Association's proposal, endorsed by the National
Association of Immigration Judges, is to create an Article I United
States Immigration Court, with trial level and appellate judges." 2 The
appellate judges would be appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, while the trial judges would be appointed by the
appellate judges." Final decisions of the appellate judge would be
subject to circuit court review. If adopted, this proposal would
dramatically increase the independence of immigration adjudicators
and help ameliorate some of the forms of executive overreaching
discussed above.
Another legislative reform that would curb executive
overreaching is to impose more constraints on Attorney General
review. Procedural constraints could include requiring the Attorney
General to give notice to the parties of the issues that will be addressed,
as well as an opportunity to submit briefs. In addition, Congress could
constrain the Attorney General's power to intervene in a case. For
example, Congress could require the Attorney General to wait until the
Board has had an opportunity to address an issue before utilizing the
review mechanism. Congress could also limit the Attorney General's
review power to issues that were raised by the parties below and
addressed by the Board, thereby preventing the Attorney General from
raising and addressing brand new issues. Most importantly, Congress
could specify that the Attorney General review mechanism should only
be used in cases that require important policy choices and that it should
not be used to curtail immigrants' procedural rights or promote
prosecution over fair adjudication. Although there is no bright line
between law and policy, relevant statutory language could help rein in
an overly aggressive Attorney General.

460.
461.
462.
463.

Statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 8, at 12.
Id
Id
Id
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An even more specific suggestion is for Congress to amend the
INA to include a private right of action that authorizes asylum seekers
to enforce the right to apply for asylum. The INA currently includes a
provision explicitly stating that no such private right of action exists."
Creating a private right of action could help asylum seekers legally
challenge executive branch policies and procedures that prevent them
from applying. A private right of action would also help establish a
constitutionally protected interest'in asylum for noncitizens outside of
the United States that could serve as the basis for a procedural due
process claim." This would help ensure that the population of asylum
seekers arguably most vulnerable to abuse-those denied admission to
the United States-are not deprived of redress for violations of the
rights Congress has given them."
Finally, Congress should address the enormous disparity in
funding for ICE's immigration enforcement operations versus the
Statutory and due process
EOIR's adjudicative operations."
cannot keep up with the
the
courts
violations are bound to result when
number of noncitizens being apprehended and placed in deportation
proceedings. Increased funding for the EOIR would support hiring
more Us, which would relieve the pressure to meet case completion
quotas and help ensure that expedience does not result in the unjust
denial of cases involving life-or-death decisions.'
464. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(dX7) (2012) ("Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party
against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.").
465. See, e.g., L.M. v. Johnson, 150 F. Supp. 3d 202,209 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that
asylum seekers could not enforce the timelines in the INA for asylum interviews through
mandamus because the statute denied a private right of action); Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v.
Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1187-88 (S.D. Fla. 2000), af'd 212 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the asylum provisions established by Congress do not create any constitutionally
protected interests on which a noncitizen outside the United States may base a procedural due
process claim).
466. See Charles Ellison, Extendmg Due Process Protections to Unadmitted Aliens
Within the US. Through the Functional Approach of Boumediene, 3 CRir. 1, 20-25 (2010)
(discussing the problems that arise for unadmitted noncitizens due to the lack of a private right
of action).
467. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FY 2018 BUDGET REQUEST, https://www.justice.gov/
file/968201/download (requesting $75 million for the EOIR); U.S. DEP'T OF HoMELAND SEC.,
FIScAL YEAR 2018: BuDGET IN BRIEF 2 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/DHS%20FY18%o20BIBo%2OFinal.pdf (stating that the total budget for DHS was
$44 billion).
468. The Administrative Conference of the United States has recognized the need for
additional resources for immigration adjudication. See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
ADMINIsTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2012-3: IMMIGRATION REMOVAL
ADJUDICATION 3, 5 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012-3.pdf.
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Agency 7}ansparencyandSelfInsulation

While the judicial and legislative branches provide checks on
executive power, career staff in the agencies directly involved in
immigration adjudication can also play an important role in protecting
against presidential influence. One of the most important things
agencies can do in this regard is to increase transparency." 9 As noted
above, the USCIS guidance on applying A-B- was shrouded in secrecy
and did not go through normal channels, which undermined public
confidence. Simply disclosing how such guidance comes about,
including what role, if any, presidential directives played, would be a
step towards greater transparency and accountability. 470 Similarly,
greater transparency about why and how training materials for asylum
officers are revised, especially when those revisions heighten legal
standards, would increase accountability.
Ultimately, the process that executive leadership uses to exert
influence may be more relevant than whether the executive leadership
exerted influence in determining whether an action is permissible.7
The substance of the influence is also important 472 For example, if the
President or Attorney General communicated a desire to curtail the
procedural rights of asylum seekers or adopted other policy choices
inconsistent with the INA, then it would be appropriate for the agency
to refuse to follow those directives.
In addition to promoting transparency, agencies can curb
executive overreach into adjudication by adopting measures that help
insulate the agency from presidential control. Self-insulation benefits
While the DOJ has been hiring more Us, it has not kept pace with the workload. See BENSON
& WHELER, supranote 18, at 6,24-30.
469. See Kate Andrias, The President'sEnforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031,
1124 (2013) ("[P]ublic disclosure of enforcement policy decisions is essentiaL'); Kathryn A.
Watts, ControllingPresidentialControl, 114 MIcH. L. REV. 683, 734-40 (2016) (arguing that
transparency-enhancing mechanisms provide one way to curb presidential control); cf Jennifer
Nou, SubdelegatingPowei, 117 COLUm. L. REV. 473,502 (2017) ("Another strategy agency
heads can use to make their subdelegations more credible is to make them more transparent").
470. Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive
Control over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE LJ. 1787, 1826 (2010) ("[Tlhough complete
insulation from political control may be unattainable (and probably also undesirable because it
would eliminate accountability), the structure of an independent agency at least enables
tensions between political actors to keep politically motivated decisiomnaking at bay.").
471. See Watts, supra note 469, at 731-32 (stressing the importance of a transparent
process).
472. Id at 731 ("[TJhe distinguishing factor between permissible and impermissible
considerations should not be the source of the influences, but rather the substance of the
influences and theprocess used to exert the influences.").
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not only the noncitizens whose cases are being adjudicated, but also the
agency. One of the biggest benefits for the agency is stability.4 73 The
EOIR and the USCIS have grappled with major fluctuations in policies
and priorities from one administration to the next, including from
Obama to Trump. In fact, one of the reasons for the enormous backlog
of cases in immigration court is shifting immigration priorities from
one administration to the next, which requires judges to repeatedly
change which cases take priority.47 4 Internal policies that allow the
EOIR to resist short-term political pressures in order to preserve longterm stability would help protect against executive overreaching and
serve the public interest.
An agency such as the EOIR, whose responsibility is fair
adjudication, should also carefully consider its relationship with ICE,
whose responsibility is enforcement. The EOIR cannot be.expected to
further the enforcement goals of ICE, or DHS more generally. In fact,
the main reason that the EOIR is not within DHS is to avoid competing
internal goals. But the close relationship that these agencies currently
share, and the expectation of cooperation communicated through
executive leadership, create significant conflicts of interest.475
Adopting internal policies that help insulate the EOIR from this
influence would protect against undue influence.
Finally, agencies should consider the cost of litigation in deciding
whether to adopt policies that help insulate them from presidential
control. When the executive becomes too aggressive and interferes in
adjudication, it increases the risk of litigation. Indeed, each of the
policies to prevent asylum adjudication discussed in Part V above has
resulted in a class action lawsuit against executive leadership. The
decisions by former Attorney General Sessions discussed in Part IV
will also likely lead to numerous direct appeals of removal orders in
federal appellate courts. This risk of litigation creates significant costs
for agencies and the executive branch in general. 476 Even if the agency
473. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEx. L. REv. 15, 24 (2010) (explaining that the desire for long-term stability has
long motivated agencies to insulate themselves from political changes in Congress or the
executive branch).
474. Statement of J. A. Ashley Tabaddor, supra note 8, at 3-4.
475. See Barkow, supra note 473, at 51 ("Even if a single agency does not have
competing internal goals, conflict can emerge from the agency's relationship with a separate
agency that is looking out for a different interest.").
476. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMN. L.
REv. 101, 121-28 (2015) (providing original empirical analysis indicating that litigation risk
reduces agency avoidance of the APA's procedural requirements).
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ultimately prevails, an enormous amount of time and resources go into
litigation. For example, although Trump prevailed in the travel ban
case, it took three versions of the ban and defending multiple lawsuits
in multiple circuits all the way up to the Supreme Court, draining
resources from the White House, the DOJ, DHS, and the Department
of State. Agencies with limited resources therefore have much to gain
from adopting internal policies that protect the agency from
presidential interference that leads to costly litigation.
VIII. CONCLUSION

An unconventional President like Donald Trump, with strong
views on immigration courts and the asylum process, forces us to
consider how much presidential interference, if any, is tolerable in this
area. We can no longer assume that the executive will refrain from
influencing the outcomes of individual cases. In order to explore the
border between permissible and impermissible actions, this Article has
explored three ways that President Trump and his appointees have
influenced immigration adjudication. Of the three, politicized
interference with adjudicators is the clearest transgression, as it
undermines fundamental beliefs in a neutral and independent decisionmaker. Using the Attorney General review process to curtail
procedural rights and promote prosecution also interferes in
adjudication, although the lines between law, policy, and enforcement
are notoriously difficult to draw. Finally, adopting policies or practices
that prevent adjudication represent the most attenuated form of
interference discussed here, but it is also one of the most dangerous.
Collectively, these forms of executive interference in immigration
adjudication threaten to dismantle the U.S. asylum system established
by Congress. Unless courts, Congress, and career agency staff check
presidential power when it interferes in adjudication, asylum seekers
risk being swiftly deported by biased adjudicators without due process.

